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The appearance of substandard ships in shipping was since the beginning a threat 
for the international community. These ships are the ones flagged by “convenience flags” 
which, in the majority of the cases, means minimum taxes, flexible crewing rules, and low 
costs, representing a dangerous situation to the other Member States. 
 
Therefore, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), as a specialized United 
Nations agency in the field investigated the causes and concluded that the implementation 
of regulations was deficient considered as the main cause of the problem. Consequently, 
the IMO established several measures to provide a solution to those affected countries and 
to eradicate those ships.  
 
In this paper, an analysis of those measures will be conducted, starting with the 
development of the Memorandums of Understanding on Port State Control (MOU´s), the 
regulation for Recognized Organizations and, since 2006, the implementation of the 
“Voluntary IMO Member States Audit Scheme” (VIMSAS). 
 
Taking into consideration the results of each measure, there will be a comparison 
between them through the use of indicators, in order to provide a critical explanation on 
the impact that those have had on the standard of ships supported by a questionnaire 
administered to the members of Viña del Mar Agreement. This study also will help to 
understand the contribution of the different measures towards reaching the current 
situation, with the full implementation of the IMSAS. 
 
The concluding chapter provides a summary of the different findings, but also some 
recommendations to enhance the continuation of the analysis including other regions for 
the benefit of every stakeholder. 
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“Today flag States are predominantly countries maintaining open registers with generally 
little maritime infrastructure. While some are keenly aware that operating a ship register 
entails responsibilities, a minority of flag States show little interest in these 
responsibilities and their performance record does credit neither to themselves nor to the 
shipowners who persist in using them. Their ships are substandard, that is, through their 
physical condition, their operation or the activities of their crew, they fail to meet basic 
standards of seaworthiness, violate international rules and standards, and pose a threat 
to life and/or the environment.” 
 
The United Nations Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, para. 85-91, 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a specialized institution of the United 
Nations. Currently, it has 174 Member States who voluntarily decided to be part of it 
through the adoption of the “IMO Convention” (IMO, 2019). 
 
The main objective of the IMO is to set international regulations that ensure the safety of 
life at sea, prevent maritime pollution from ships, facilitate global shipping and provide 
the basis to guarantee the necessary and uniform knowledge of every seafarer. To 
accomplish these objectives, the IMO has published thousands of instruments, counting 
conventions, codes, resolutions, and guidelines, to provide legal support for almost every 
issue related to shipping. Each Member State has the right, provided by the IMO 
Convention, to decide which instruments it would like to ratify according to its particular 
situation (IMO, 2019). 
 
Once a Member State decides to ratify an instrument, it assumes the responsibility and 
obligation to implement its measures into its national law, to provide the compulsory legal 
framework inside its jurisdiction. These requirements are established in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law at Seas (UNCLOS) 1982, which provides the background 
needed to understand the main issues of ratification and implementation. 
  
For that reason, the UNCLOS serves as a "framework convention", crafting a delicate 
balance between, on the one hand, the rights and jurisdictions that may be exercised by 
coastal states in their maritime zones and, on the other hand, the historical freedom of 
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navigation enjoyed by all flag states and their mutations in various zones. Considering 
this, the IMO plays a central role in facilitating international cooperation and maintaining 
the balance between the pursuit of the flag and coastal State interests (Basaran, 2016). 
 
Basically, the UNCLOS establishes key concepts that help to clarify rights and obligations 
related to the international navigation of ships. For example, in article 5 it establishes that 
every State (not only coastal States) has the right to sail ships under its flag, however, they 
must still comply with legislation contained in UNCLOS when operating on the high seas. 
In a few words, this is the main doctrine that circumscribes the obligations of a State as a 
“Flag State”. In article 94, UNCLOS establishes that every Flag State should set the basic 
measures to ensure the safety of its ships regarding construction and equipment (United 
Nation Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), 1982). 
 
UNCLOS also provides a clear explanation about the rights of another important actor in 
the “international shipping framework”: the coastal state. The law, in its article 56 sets the 
main rights for coastal states, establishing that the national legislation inside the 
jurisdiction of the coastal areas should be complied with by every foreign ship. Another 
important concept that the UNCLOS sets in its text is that every State has the right to 
verify ships in their ports, to ensure compliance with the requirements of the adopted 
international maritime legislation. It is this doctrine that establishes the framework for 
“Port State Control” (United Nation Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), 
1982). 
 
All these concepts create an opportunity for the international community to establish the 
regulations to control the shipping activities conducted from one port to other, where the 
ships are flying different flags as well as complying with the international and national 
legislations, depending on the jurisdiction where they are navigating (Hosanee, 2009). 
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1.2 Problem raised and measures taken 
The “rules of the game” have been clearly established with the rights and obligations; 
however, every law gives the opportunity to avoid its fulfillment, or at least it provides 
the possibility to operate in a “gray area” of the law. That is how the “open registries” 
appeared in the world. Radically, these registries, pejoratively known as “convenience 
flags”, are Member States´ ship registries that allow ships to fly their flags with fewer 
safety requirements, minimum taxation, flexible crewing rules, and more lenient labor 
laws. The proliferation of many “open registries” during the ´80s resulted in a rise of 
“substandard ships” operating globally (Mejia & Mukherjee, 2013). 
 
The IMO defines substandard ships as, “a ship whose hull, machinery, equipment or 
operational safety is substantially below the standards required by the relevant convention 
or whose crew is not in conformance with the safe manning document” (IMO, 2011). 
 
Substandard ships were blamed for issues ranging from their being used by smugglers to 
traffic guns, drugs, people and in some sectors to threat of environmental disasters, such 
as the one involving the M/V “Prestige”, that occurred off Spain in 2002 (Lee, 2003). 
 
With a view to counteract the spread of substandard ships, the IMO decided to take actions 
by the development of measures to be adopted by its Member States, such as:  
 the establishment of Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control,  
 regulation for Recognized Organizations (RO), and 
 the implementation of the “Voluntary IMO Member States Audit Scheme 
(VIMSAS)” 
1.3 Aim of this dissertation 
The main objective of this dissertation is to analyze each of the aforementioned measures 
adopted by the IMO and demonstrate if, throughout the time, they have had a positive 
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effect on the attempt to eradicate the substandard ships that are navigating all around the 
world. 
 
Essentially, to conduct a proper analysis, it is crucial to understand the origins of the 
problems and how the measures have been developed; therefore, there will be a review of 
basic concepts. 
 
With the results of the analysis, it will not only be possible to determine which measure 
was or is still the most appropriate one to eradicate those ships, but also the analysis will 
provide an overall vision of the current situation.  
1.4 Chapter structure 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 to 5 discuss each of 
the aforementioned measures adopted by the IMO to eradicate substandard ships. The 
methodology is described in Chapter 6, and analysis is conducted in Chapter 7 to arrive at 
conclusions and recommendations, specifically for the member States of the Viña del Mar 















Chapter 2 – Sources of rights and obligations for the Member States 
This Chapter provides an introduction and explanation of the relevant concepts that are 
used in every maritime international legislation. These concepts help to support the 
establishment of rights and obligations that each stakeholder possesses. Therefore, it will 
provide the reader with the background to the overall problem treated throughout the 
dissertation. In order to do that, the explanation will begin with the analysis of the 
UNCLOS and it will conclude describing the development of the “open registries”. 
2.1 Presentation of UNCLOS 
UNCLOS is one of the components of public international law, as it involves relationships 
between countries and applies “norms regarded as binding on all members of the 
international community”. Particularly, UNCLOS provides the legal framework for the 
exploitation of the world´s oceans, and at the same time clarifies the responsibilities of the 
signatory nations that currently stand at 168, according to the chronological records of the 
Division for Oceans Affairs and the Law of the Sea of United Nations (Division for the 
Oceans & Law of the Seas - United Nations, 2019). 
 
It can be defined as the overall framework for all oceans activities; however, by itself, it 
is not able to cover every issue that takes place in such a huge area; therefore, further 
substantiation and implementation is vital and necessary. It is in this point where other 
international specialized institutions, such as the IMO help to achieve that objective. To 
comply with that function, the IMO establishes regulations, generally, through 
“Conventions”, that are applied by the Member States providing a mandatory international 
framework. Therefore, the UNCLOS is considered on many occasions as the “mother of 




The UNCLOS III (for historical references see Appendix A) is the current version, and 
covers all of the ground of its 1958 version, and quite a lot more throughout the 16 parts 
in which it is divided. Some of the areas covered are the continental shelves, straits, 
territorial sea, high seas, the deep seabed, EEZ, innocent passage, nationality of ships, 
collisions at sea, pollution, and settlements of disputes (Freestone, Barnes, & Ong, 2007). 
 
Also, in its article 136, it provides that both the area that includes the seabed, ocean floor, 
and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction or economic zone and its 
resources are “the common heritage of mankind” and that no sovereignty or other rights 
to this area and its resources may be recognized (United Nation Convention on the Law 
of the Seas (UNCLOS), 1982). 
2.2 In-depth UNCLOS´ definitions providing conceptual basis 
Among all the relevant topics covered by UNCLOS, some key definitions provide the 
needed background to other international conventions, to form and establish the legal 
international framework that allows the development of the maritime shipping as known-
today. 
 
Part II of the UNCLOS establishes the rights that every country has to set its own territorial 
seas and contiguous zone. To do so, the instrument provides key definitions about how to 
measure that by the establishment of the so-called “baselines”, regulated in its articles 5, 
7 and special provision from 8 to 13 (United Nation Convention on the Law of the Seas 
(UNCLOS), 1982). It was one of the most important developments of this instrument 
because the baselines allow measuring the breadth of the territorial sea established as the 
low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the 
coastal State. From that line, every country can establish “legally” its “Maritime 
Aquatory”. This definition includes the internal waters defined as the waters contained 
between the coast and the baseline and the territorial sea, the area contained from the 
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baseline to the mile number 12. Inside this area, the State has territorial sovereignty, which 
includes airspace over the area, as well the seabed and subsoil (Anderson, 2008). 
 
From the line established as the end of the “territorial sea” till the mile 12, the country can 
establish the “contiguous zone”, where they have functional sovereignty. This type of 
sovereignty, in the corresponding cases, can be extended to till the mile 200 which is the 
limit of the “Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)” (Part V UNCLOS). The term “functional 
sovereignty” means that the coastal State is not the “owner” of this territory; however, its 
status is unique and can be described as something in-between, where the State has some 
rights, especially over the resources in there. From the final limit of the EEZ till the EEZ 
of another country, all the sea area in the middle is considered as “The High Sea” with 
particular regulation contained in Part VII of the UNCLOS. 
 
Unlike the high seas, the seabed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction, called “the Area” (UNCLOS Part XI) was put under the administration of a 
special international organization, namely the International Seabed Authority (ISA). In 
the article 136, the instrument states that this area is designated as a global common in 
light by their use for the whole community, having a strong relationship with the definition 
firstly utilized in 1967 as a “common heritage of mankind”, textually mentioned in the 
instrument (Nelson, 2005). 
 
Undoubtedly, the definition of these areas was one of the most relevant developments 
included in the instrument, as it allows to set the basis to every other international 
regulation. It clearly defines the rights and obligation for every ship and, therefore, for 
every member State. As it was highlighted in Chapter 1, the UNCLOS also provides 
regulations detailing the rights and especially the obligations to the States divided into the 




The legal status of the areas described implies that the coastal state has the right to exercise 
a certain level of control and enforcement over-regulation related to customs, fiscal 
matters, immigration, and sanitary laws. For that reason, the State can impose penalties 
for a ship flying another flag is not complying with those regulations (Marten, 2011). 
Moreover, the current version of UNCLOS contains a procedure to settle disputes between 
States, which is considered relevant to solve differences in a peaceful form. (See Appendix 
B) 
2.3 Appearance of “Flag of Convenience” / “Open Registries” 
UNCLOS, in its article 94, provides the legal platform for the registration system 
specifying that each State should maintain a register of ships containing the particulars of 
each vessel flying the flag, as well as their names. As ship’s registration and nationality 
plays an important role towards security and safety of the maritime realm as well as 
significantly contributes to the protection and preservation of the maritime environment. 
It has been subject of many studies and research in order to analyze and better clarify the 
main issues regarding these essential legal components (Ermal & Krisafi, 2013). 
 
However, issues of enforcement are always complicated in the context of international 
shipping due to the inevitable clashes of jurisdiction that arise. Vessels move around the 
world, subject to the law of their flag state, and enter waters over which coastal states have 
authority and, while in a coastal state’s waters a vessel may breach the law of either or 
both states, giving rise to a conflict of enforcement interests. The flag state may argue that 
it is primarily responsible for the vessel and insist on taking enforcement action itself. The 
coastal state may reply that its rights are more directly affected given the vessel’s location 
at the time of the breach and commence its enforcement actions (Mejia & Mukherjee, 
2013). 
 
In this context and as it was explained in Chapter 1, it is the flag State who has the main 
jurisdiction, right or obligation to ensure that the ship meets generally accepted 
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international safety, crewing, and anti-pollution standards, according to what is 
established in article 94 of UNCLOS. It also contributes to avoiding any clashes while it 
is entering in another country´s jurisdiction. 
 
Currently, most flag states have set ships’ standards based on the many existent 
international maritime regulations such as the International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS), and in an ideal world, flag states would also ensure that those 
standards are being implemented and adequately managed (The International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974). However, the reality is that in many 
instances, adequate regulation is not being achieved, and “substandard ships” present a 
potential danger for the coastal state (Yu, Zhao, & Chang, 2017). 
 
This is where the State with jurisdiction implements the “Port State Control”, a concept 
that has existed for a long time. According to the territoriality principle as defined under 
customary international law, when a ship is in port, and thus under the sovereignty of the 
coastal state, it is subject to the laws of the port state (Cariou & Wolff, 2015). 
 
Nonetheless, it would be inaccurate to blame all substandard ships and notorious incidents 
on the flag of convenience (FOC) states since many of the leading ship owners with 
excellent safety records are actually operating under FOCs, and a number of FOC states 
are parties to the principal maritime conventions and have made determined efforts to 
fulfill their conventional obligations (Lee, 2003). 
 
There is still little doubt, however, that many of these states, which account for a majority 
of the world “registry market,” act—as the expression FOC suggests—in a manner to 
encourage the registration of a greater number of vessels in their national registry. FOC 
states are usually reluctant to impose strict standards and do not have the ability, even 
when they are willing, to adequately discharge the international obligations weighing upon 
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them to exercise effective supervision of ships’ standards (Thuong, 1985). This 
unsatisfactory situation is partially a result of the lack of any meaningful connection 
between FOC states, ship owners, and their ships. That is the main reason why the “FOC” 
name is used in some literature; however, it must be stated that some authors have 
highlighted that the proper term to be used should be “Open Registries” (Roe, 2015). 
 
Although Article 91 of UNCLOS requires that there exists a genuine link between the flag 
state and a ship, it does not specify what elements constitute a genuine link and how this 
requirement should be enforced (United Nation Convention on the Law of the Seas 
(UNCLOS), 1982). 
 
Trying to solve this huge worldwide problem that raised the attention of many “coastal 
States”, especially during the ´80s, the United Nations intended to create an international 
instrument “1986 United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships”. 
The main objective was to identify factors that would establish a genuine link: the 
participation of the state or its nationals in the ownership of ships; the involvement of 
nationals or persons domiciled or lawfully in permanent residence in that state in the 
manning of ships; and the establishment of the ship-owning company and/or its principal 
place of business within the territory of the flag state (Yu, Zhao, & Chang, 2017). 
 
However, this convention emphasizes the existence of economic links between the flag 
state and a given ship. Unfortunately, this convention is not yet in force and some scholars 
predicted that the situation is unlikely to change, leaving the question of what constitutes 
“a genuine link” still unresolved, and therefore the spread of substandard ships along the 
world (McDougal, Burke, & Vlasic, 1960). On the other hand, some other States, such as 
China, decided to take stronger measures in its registration policies after assuming the 
failure of the emplaced system trying to handle the “flagging out” problem (Chen, Li, Liu, 




Despite the fact that the rights and obligations for every stakeholder of the maritime 
community have been established since the origins of the international activities, the 
mentioned “grey areas” threatened the whole scenario. Therefore, an international actor 
had to enter into action in order to provide the needed mitigating which will be analyzed 







Chapter 3 – Measures adopted by the IMO against substandard ships 
In Chapter 1 the substandard ships were defined, while in Chapter 2 it was explained how 
the international legislation allowed the appearance of the “open registries” or so-called 
“flag of convenience”. The IMO, as a specialized organization of the UN realized the 
threat that those ships represented and, therefore, it began to develop measures to 
counteract them. This chapter is aimed to introduce them. 
3.1 Measures taken by IMO 
It is usually said that the “maritime safety” can be seen as successive networks, where 
each of the networks represents an actor that interacts with others in order to ensure the 
safety of ships and crew at sea; starting with the IMO that, as a specialized United Nations´ 
agency, is in charge of providing the international instruments to regulate a safe and clean 
navigation along the oceans (see Appendix C for more information about IMO). Then, as 
a second net appears the flag State, with the responsibility to attest that its ships comply 
with the IMO regulations. The next step is the classification societies or Recognized 
Organizations that certify the seaworthiness of the ships since the construction. The crew 
members and the Captain are the ones who know the real situation of the vessel and that 
is why they are considered one of the main actors in this structure. Lastly, when the 
previous nets cannot work effectively, port state control comes into practice (Oya, 2004). 
Therefore, the first step by IMO was to focus on the development of its Member States in 
their function as “flag State”, as explained in Chapter 1. 
3.1.1 Flag State implementation assistance measures 
During the 18th Assembly (4th November 1993) the IMO adopted the Resolution A.740 
(18). This document consisted of Interim Guidelines to assist flag States in the 
implementation of existing IMO regulations, recognizing the concern of many States and, 
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thereupon, the recommendations made by the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and the 
Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). The instrument encouraged flag 
States to develop policies to implement the international regulation adopted in the national 
framework and enforce them. In order to do so, the instrument asked them to provide 
enough personnel with appropriate technical expertise and background, qualified to guide, 
direct and manage the programme, but also the needed facilities to comply with the 
regulations contained in the instruments.  
 
The guidelines also established that if during the implementation of the international 
legislation the flag States faced difficulties, they should inform the IMO and also apply, 
when necessary, for technical assistance (IMO, 1993b). 
 
At that time, authors like, for example, Andre Nollkaemper showed doubts about 
the effect that those guidelines would have, stating:  
In particular as regards developed flag states, it can hardly be assumed that a 
clarification of what states are required to do will make any difference; there is no 
doubt that if sufficient will were present, the existing obligations would be 
sufficient (Wonham, 1998, p. 377). 
 
On 27th November 1997, during the 20th Assembly, the IMO adopted the Resolution A.847 
(20), revoking the previously mentioned resolution and establishing the “Guidelines to 
Assist Flag States in the Implementation of IMO Instruments”. In the text, again IMO 
placed the stress on the members as flag States, stating that they are the ones who should 
take any necessary step to ensure the observance of the international legislation on 
maritime safety and pollution prevention, standards laid down in the IMO documents. To 
do so, the document provides a set of steps that every member State should take as 
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recommendatory to fulfill the needs. For instance, the guidelines provided initial actions, 
steps for the correct implementation of the instruments, measures to ensure the delegation 
of authority, enforcement of the legislation and finally, requirements for the flag surveyors 
and investigators (IMO, 1997). 
 
Continuing with the measures, the adoption of the Resolution A.912 (22) on 22nd January 
2002, can be seen as a step forward by the IMO highlighting that flag States have the 
primary responsibility to have in place an adequate and effective system to exercise 
control over ships entitled to fly their flag, and to ensure that they comply with relevant 
international rules and regulations. Therefore, in this resolution, the IMO incorporated 
another tool to “measure” the level of compliance of each member by the use of a self-
assessment questionnaire. The objective was that every member State, bearing in mind the 
Resolution A.847 (20) explained previously and the indicators criteria detailed in the 
appendix of the Resolution, could complete the self- assessment form and submit it to the 
Organization. The main idea of the member State filling the form was to provide to the 
IMO with the useful information so as to enable and assist the organization to identify, 
qualify and quantify, the needs and the priorities of the State in question. However, it had 
a second objective and that was to serve as a “wake-up call” to the member States acting 
as flag State, as they would be able to ascertain which function and obligation they were 
not complying with (IMO, 2002). 
 
This instrument was created to be mandatory trying to improve the previous Resolution 
A.881 (21); however, due to the pressure and the unacceptable reception of many member 
States, there was a disappointing uptake of a voluntary process. As at November 2003, as 
Marten-Castex stated (Mansell, 2009), only 53 original responses and 18 updates had been 
received showing that the process was effectively moribund. Therefore, more robust 
initiatives were required to address the vexed issue of effective flag State implementation. 
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In the following sections, an explanation of the approach that IMO adopted after facing 
these experiences to develop more integrated measures will be provided. 
3.1.2 Measures related to the delegation of authority 
Another important aspect that concerned not only the IMO but also all the member States 
was the delegation of authority that many governments were doing at that moment, as 
briefly stated in Chapter 1. It can be seen that, since the very first interim guidelines, the 
topic was present and according to the text, the increased space dedicated to this issue was 
becoming even more relevant as a recognition of its importance. 
 
During the 18th Assembly, the same meeting where the interim guidelines for flag States 
were approved, the IMO also approved the resolution A.739 (18), “Guidelines for the 
Authorization of Organizations acting on behalf of the Administration”. This instrument 
intended to set standards to the way the several member States were delegating the 
authority to some organizations (IMO, 1993a). 
 
The main concern was, as Mansell argued, that although some statutory functions, such 
as the granting of exemptions, must be executed by the flag state. Many states have 
allowed delegation with regard to not only surveys, inspections and the issuing of 
certificates, but also to the entire maritime administration, including enforcement and 
granting of exemptions, in contravention of the relevant provisions (Takei, 2013). 
 
The recommendatory instrument established that the Government should have a written 
formal agreement with the organization that from that moment would be the “recognized 
organization (RO)” to act on its behalf. It also settled that the State should provide to the 
RO with the national legislation to be considered by them during the certification or 
inspection of the ships. The evaluation and monitoring of the RO´s for the States is 
something that was also established in the resolution, in order to ensure that it has the 
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needed capacity and to maintain oversight of their compliance with the activities 
delegated. 
 
In the appendix of the Resolution, it established the minimum standards for recognized 
organizations acting on behalf of the Administration. A certain number of prescriptions 
that the RO should comply with were settled, such as the number of personnel, and their 
qualifications, the need to implement and maintain an internationally recognized quality 
system, such as ISO 9000 among others. Moreover, it provided all the elements that the 
written agreement should contain, such as the legal basis to the statement of the activities 
delegated and the procedure to report to the Administration. 
 
In addition, during the 19th Assembly, the IMO adopted the Resolution A.789 (19) 
“Specifications on the Survey and Certification Functions of Recognized Organizations 
Acting on Behalf of the Administration”. This document contains minimum specifications 
for organizations recognized as capable of performing statutory work on behalf of a flag 
State Administration in terms of certification and survey functions connected with the 
issuance of international certificates.  
 
The main objective of this resolution was to divide the specifications required into 
different elementary modules to select the relevant modules for each function of 
certification and survey. Therefore, it divided the modules into four areas: management, 
technical appraisal, surveys and qualifications, and training (IMO, 1995). 
 
Both resolutions showed the concern of the community on how the original role of the 
classification societies changed from determining the standard of ships construction into 
a new dominant, confusing and contradictory role where they were in charge of ship´s 
construction, equipment, safe and secure operation. Recognizing that they are the 
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depository of technical expertise it is hard to imagine a world without them, as Fairplay 
stated in 2005 (Mansell, 2009). 
 
However, the problem of the substandard ships continued as these resolutions were not 
mandatory; therefore, its implementation was voluntary for the Member States. For that 
reason, the adoption of the Resolution MSC.349 (92) and MEPC.237(65) made mandatory 
the Code for Recognized Organizations (RO Code). It became mandatory owing to the 
amendments of the main international instruments, such as SOLAS, MARPOL and LL 
Conventions. 
 
The RO Code is basically the conjunction of the previously explained two resolutions 
regarding RO´s including more specifications gained through the experiences. It consists 
of three parts: the first one contains the mandatory requirements that an organization 
should fulfill to be recognized by a flag State; the second one the mandatory requirements 
that an RO should achieve when performing statutory certification and services on behalf 
of its authorizing flag States but also the mandatory requirements that flag States should 
adhere to when authorizing an RO; and the last one is recommendatory guidelines for flag 
State oversight of ROs (IMO, 2013). 
 
The mentioned amendments allowed the entry into force of the RO Code since the 1st of 
January 2015; therefore, currently every delegation of authority is obliged to comply with 
the regulations contained in it. However, as it was previously observed by Barchue, this 
has not fully produced the desired result. Parties to SOLAS periodically provide 
information to IMO on the authorization granted to ROs based on the aforementioned 
regulation, but there is still no independent mechanism to verify that the RO Code´s 
provisions are unscrupulously adhered to by Parties and ROs. For that reason, the 
competence of the various ROs, their representatives and ROs accountability to the 
international community cannot be verified (Barchue, 2009). 
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3.1.3 Development of MOU on Port State Control 
Coming back to the concept of “maritime safety” as successive networks where each of 
them represents an actor that interacts with other in order to ensure the safety of ships and 
crew at sea, the IMO, especially during the ´90s, recognized the importance of Port State 
Control (PSC), stated as the last net in that concept that will act when the others failed to 
do so (Marten, 2011). 
 
PSC can be defined as the control of foreign-flagged ships while they are in jurisdictional 
ports. The IMO, continuing with its efforts to ensure maritime safety, participated actively 
in the first PSC Programme organized in 1982, and after some years, the world was 
divided into ten different MOU developed in a fast and effective way, covering most of 
the ports and coastlines (Li & Zheng, 2008). 
 
However, for some authors, the reason of the existence of the port state control regime 
derives from the fact that a certain percentage of ship owners and flag states use the legal 
“loophole” created by the international legal framework and try to save costs by operating 
below the minimum safety standards (Knapp, 2007). 
 
Following the initiative of the European Union (see Appendix D), it started to encourage 
the development of MOU on PSC (Qu, Zhen, Howlett, & Jain, 2019). Basically, the main 
objective of the MOUs is to provide a regional framework for the Maritime Authorities 
that conduct the PSC for having the same framework and procedures, facilitating the 
exchange of information and sharing the same database. This initiative has resulted in ten 





Figure 1- World Wide MOU´s 
Adapted from (The Mediterranean Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control 
(Mediterranean MOU), 2019) 
Accordingly, the port inspectors are fulfilling an important task in upholding vessel 
standards, as well as helping protect the lives of seafarers. It has even been argued that 
effective port state control measures surpass flag state enforcement as a more practical 
means of deterring substandard vessels (Marten, 2011). 
3.2 Support measures for the development of MOU 
Moreover, the IMO created the Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments 
(III) that brings together flag, port, and coastal States to consider implementation issues. 
The III receives and analyses port State control information and keeps under review the 
procedures for port State control. During the session, they analyze the yearly reports, that 
every MOU sends to the IMO (IMO, 2019). 
 
To allow the development of inspections onboard a ship, as it was explained in Chapter 2, 
the UNCLOS sets the legal framework to conduct the inspection; however, the IMO 
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provided the needed empowerment through several articles in the international legislation, 
such as: SOLAS - Chapter I, Part B – Regulation 19, LL - article 21 or STCW – Article 
X. 
 
As it is known each Member State has the right to decide which international convention 
to ratify; however, once a convention is ratified the State has the obligation to implement 
it to comply with the regulation. This concept was a huge problem at the beginning of the 
implementation of the MOU because many of the “flags of convenience” were not part of 
the most important conventions and therefore the PSC were asking for the fulfillment of 
regulation that was not recognized by the flag State (Lee, 2003). 
 
This issue was easily solved by the implementation of the “non-favorable treatment” 
principle. It means that a ship cannot have a more favorable treatment compared with 
others. In other words, it means that a ship that enters into jurisdictional waters should 
comply with the international regulation that the State had adopted, independently from 
its flag (Graziano, Ölcer, & Schröder-Hinrichs, 2017). That is how discrimination was 
eradicated and also this unification prevents the existence of commercial barriers between 
countries. Another risk is the development of “ports of convenience”, which have less 
stringent enforcement and, therefore, the IMO should monitor closely if competition on 
law problems appear (Popescu, Varsami, Hanza-Pazara, & Acomi, 2011). 
 
Progressively, many regions copied the model settled by the Paris MOU and currently, 
there are ten MOU´s around the world. However, there is not a unified patron of control 
as each MOU establishes freely some procedures based on the mentioned Guidelines 
provided by IMO. For example, not every MOU uses the same codification for the 
deficiencies and not all of them have access to other´s databases. That could lead to a ship 
being inspected in one MOU´s jurisdiction without deficiencies and once it enters to 
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another it could be inspected again and with a different result (Graziano, Cariou, Wolff, 
Mejia, & Schröder-Hinrichs, 2017). 
 
In this respect, the IMO Assembly adopted Resolution A.1119 (30) on the procedures for 
PSC, 2017. It is a guide for the Member States to harmonize the way each administration 
conducts and implements the procedures in an attempt to standardize the world-wide 
implementation of those controls. This document is updated periodically and its main 
purpose is not only to provide a basic guideline, but also afford consistency in the conduct 
of these inspections, the recognition of deficiencies of a ship, its equipment, or its crew, 
and the application of control procedures (IMO, 2018). 
 
However, many studies analyze a different characteristic to control in order to detect a 
substandard ship through a port state inspection, for instance, some of those analyses have 
been incorporated in the Concentration Inspections Campaigns (CIC), to target specific 
types of deficiencies (Cariou & Wolff, 2015). 
 
The adopted route seems to be the correct one to increase the levels of maritime safety, 
however, the responsibilities as a flag State cannot be replaced by the PSC, which is why 
port state control is not, and can never be a substitute for the proper exercise of flag state 
responsibility. The primary responsibility to safeguard against substandard ships lies with 
the flag states. It is when flag states fail to meet their commitments that the port state 
comes into play. Therefore, the adoption of MOU was a first step taken by the IMO. The 
following two chapters will analyze one of the most controversial measures that the 








Chapter 4 –Voluntary IMO Member States Audit Scheme (VIMSAS) 
This chapter will explain the development of another measure undertaken by the IMO, 
focused on the performance of its Member States regarding the accomplishment of the 
obligations contained in the international instrument adopted. 
 
To proceed further it is essential to define another key concept – audit. 
The University of Cambridge defines an “audit” as an official examination of the quality 
or condition of something. That definition is closely related with other words such as 
“externally” or “independently”, meaning that the process should be conducted by not 
member of “the something” being audited (University of Cambridge Dictionary, 2019). 
4.1 Development of VIMSAS 
Following the example and the experience of the aviation sector (see Appendix F), the 
IMO decided to establish an audit scheme too. The IMO Council, at its 88th session in 
June 2002, considered and approved, in principle, a proposal by nineteen Member States 
for the development of an “IMO Model Audit Scheme”. This proposal was originated 
mainly by developing countries expressing the existent concern about the huge number of 
substandard ships that were still navigating around the world (Barchue, 2006). 
 
Recalling what was explained in the previous chapter, the Audit Scheme was a result of a 
lengthy process regarding increasing flag State compliance. The main problem observed 
by the IMO since the beginning was strictly related to flag States obligations. Proof of that 
is the statement mentioned by the IMO Secretary General at that time, Mr. William 
O´Neill, while he was introducing the self-assessment measure, also detailed in the 
previous chapter:  
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“I believe that the problems perceived today do not lie basically with shipping’s regulatory 
framework or with the mechanism by which that framework is constructed, but with its 
implementation.” (Mansell, 2009). 
 
However, observing that the results were not as desired and the situation regarding the 
number of substandard ships was not improving, the IMO finally decided to approve the 
proposal to set an independent mechanism of examination of the Member States 
implementation of their obligations. It can be seen as an evolution from the Self-
Assessment of Flag State Performance by the introduction of a third party to the 
assessment process (Molenaar, 2014). 
 
Since that moment many decisions have been taken by the IMO to start the 
implementation of the Audit Scheme. The first measure was in 2003, namely the approval 
by the MSC together with the MEPC of a proposal made by the FSI Subcommittee 
consisting of the development of a new code to help the implementation of the IMO 
mandatory instruments. The approval was made immediately and they also agreed that the 
instrument would be considered as the standard to conduct the several audits under the 
scheme (Seo, 2010). 
 
A set of documentation to support the development of the scheme was needed, therefore, 
the Council requested the MSC and MEPC for the establishment of a Joint Working Group 
(JWG) to do so. The inaugural meeting of the JWG was held in June 2003 during the 
MEPC 77 and the first outcome was a clear strategy, with timeframe, for the concurrent 
development of the documentation for the Audit Scheme and the Code (Seo, 2010). 
 
During this period of time, the Council assumed a relevant role in the development of the 
Audit Scheme as it was designated to drive the entire process, transforming the character 
of monitoring the implementation of IMO instruments. Therefore, in June 2003 it took 
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several measures to set the basis of the scheme. The settlement of the principles that were 
going to be considered along the scheme was one of the most relevant one. The need of 
those principles was the concern shown by many member States that were worried about 
the scheme, arguing that it would cause lack of sovereignty or also allow to externalize 
the internal weaknesses of the Maritime Administration. For that reason, principles such 
as the respect of sovereignty, universality, confidentiality, fairness, and transparency were 
defined from the beginning. 
 
Apart from the assignment of some function to the SG and some others to the JWG, the 
Council approved and submitted the text of the Resolution A.946 (23), which was finally 
adopted by the Assembly, in which it was stated the establishment and further 
development of the VIMSAS to be implemented on a voluntary basis without the 
exclusion of the possibility in the future of it becoming mandatory. The text also urged 
governments to volunteer to be audited to assist the Organization in its efforts to achieve 
consistent and effective implementation of IMO instruments, and it clarifies that the 
intention of the scheme is only for further enhancing the implementation of instruments 
and for determining the technical co-operation assistance needs of audited States that 
would otherwise be unable to remediate identified shortcomings and enhance further their 
recognized efforts in critical areas of implementation (IMO, 2003). 
 
The following year, 2004, the Council decided to proceed forward with the Scheme by 
undertaking pilot audits of member States to obtain an outcome that could be analyzed by 
the JWG and contribute to the development of the documentation ongoing. Therefore, six 
Member States, in two groups of three, took up the offer to conduct pilot audits using the 
draft of an instrument called “Framework and Procedures” as were developed by the JWG 




Those pilot audits showed motivating results as the six members found that the 
instruments used during the process were effective, helpful, workable and consistent with 
the principles stated. They also recognized that the experience was useful to learn and 
realize chances for improvements. Moreover, they provided some feedback regarding the 
instruments to be considered by the JWG to finalize the work with them during the 
meeting in 2005. 
 
The promising results observed during the pilot process encouraged the whole system to 
speed up the process of developing instruments. This led to the completion of the Code 
for the implementation of mandatory IMO instruments (III Code) and the Framework and 
Procedures for the VIMSAS, with both being adopted by the Assembly in November 2005 
as resolutions A.973(24) and A.974(24), respectively (IMO, 2005b). 
4.2 Kick-off of the VIMSAS 
After four years of intense work, the basis to begin the development of the VIMSAS was 
ready, tested and approved. However, many challenges arose, the most important of which 
was the need of willingness of the Member States because by virtue of its voluntary status 
the Scheme was not going to begin without any voluntary nomination. It was considered 
as a key tool in the battle against substandard ships, according to IMO SG Efthimios E. 
Mitropoulos as he opened the second session of the ad hoc Council joint working group 
(Wolters Kluwer Legal & Regulatory, 2004). 
 
The documentation, as it was designed, covered the considered ten most important IMO 
instruments (see Appendix G). This meant that the complexity of the process was 
considered another huge challenge together with the need for sufficient human resources 
to cover all these areas. The economic factor was another issue, as it was established at 
that point, the expenses to receive an audit under the VIMSAS scheme was under the 





From the IMO point of view, there were also many challenges to be overcome, one of the 
most important being the need of qualified and available personnel that could act as 
auditors. As it was settled, those auditors would be part of other Maritime Administrations 
as the Member States were invited to nominate staff with the expertise needed. Moreover, 
the administrative workload was going to experience a high increment, such as translation, 
reception of reports and statistics treatment. 
 
By the end of 2006, the VIMSAS was fully operative and most concerns were resolved. 
The first Member State to be audited was Denmark, in September 2006, followed by 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Liberia sending a message that the most 
developed countries were the ones in favor of the implementation of the Scheme. As of 
July 2007, thirty-two Member States had volunteered for audits. By 2008, forty-five 
Member States had volunteered to be audited and 27 of them had been audited. 
Meanwhile, the IMO had received nominations of 150 personnel complying with the 
requirements to become an auditor, from 42 Member States from all geographical regions 
of the world (Barchue, 2009). 
 
The fact that the States as mentioned have been audited was one of the indications to other 
States of their support of the audit scheme and their commitment to implement it and 
together with the will to identify the lapses and shortcomings that should be amended to 
improve procedures and performance in their administration, made other States nominate 
themselves (Anthony, 2007).  
 
Another important improvement was made by the provision of technical assistance, not 
only to train auditors but also to assist Member State to remediate shortcomings identified 
from audits. To deal with those problems, the IMO’s Integrated Technical Co-operation 
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Programme (ITCP) had a fundamental role in holding courses around the world (Mansell, 
2009). 
 
The audits started being conducted following the established process (see Appendix H) 
and in general, the idea was a very welcoming development within the IMO framework 
and some authors expected that it was going to be transferred into the EU to help in 
improving the implementation and interpretation of IMO conventions. Although a 
voluntary tool, it was expected to become more or less mandatory for some large flag 
states and allow for giving an incentive through decreased port state control inspections 
(Knapp, 2007). 
4.3 Institutionalization process 
Taking into consideration what was established in Resolution A.946 (23), the Council 
during its 102nd session decided to make real the “possibility in the future of it becoming 
mandatory”. That decision was sent to the Assembly, which during its 26th session, 
November 2009, approved the Resolution A.1018 (26) endorsing the decision of the 
Council for a phased-in introduction of the Organization’s Audit Scheme as an 
institutionalized process through the inclusion of appropriate requirements in the IMO 
instruments (IMO, 2009). 
 
The change of the status from voluntary to “mandatory” was considered as one of the most 
important decisions taken by the IMO. Some authors, like Barchue, argued that there were 
several benefits in doing so, mainly due to generic lessons learned from audits that could 
be provided to all the Member States so that the benefits could be widely shared (Seo, 
2010). 
 
The resolution provided a time frame and schedule of activities for the consideration and 
introduction of an institutionalized IMO Member State Audit Scheme and the Council 
outlined a schedule enlisting all the Member States and the order in which they were going 
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to be audited beginning with those without experience during VIMSAS and placing at the 
end the others. It also encouraged Member Governments to continue to volunteer to be 
audited. 
 
That was considered as “the end” of VIMSAS itself because during the 28th session of the 
Assembly a new set of instruments was going to be approved changing the “voluntary” 
concept. Of course, the change was going to happen after a period of time when the 
activities were going to be conducted into a “transitional status”. 
 
The VIMSAS provided an important basis to the new era, where 79 Member States and 2 
Associate Members presented their willingness to be audited and 59 were finally audited 
together with the 2 Associate Members and 5 dependent territories (see Appendix N). 
 
Countries like, for example, the Republic of Argentina recognized that the audit during 
VIMSAS was a successful process highlighting, however, that there were some issues to 
be improved such as the expenses of the audit, the comprehension of the local Maritime 
Administration. Moreover, the Member States recognized that the Scheme could 
incorporate more instruments but it was not the right moment to do so and agreed that the 
scheme could be institutionalized (Republic of Argentina, 2009). 
 
However, 79 Member States only represents about half of the total Member States and 
there were also many other issues to be considered, for example, the Maritime 
Administration had the chance to excuse itself from a part of the audit during the process 
alluding that it was not ready or not in favor of the process. Bearing this in mind and 
considering that it was the first attempt to do so, the process was helpful but weak in 
certain aspects, so the decision adopted by the Assembly definitely was focused on those 







Chapter 5 – IMO Member States Audit Scheme (IMSAS) 
This is the last theoretical chapter and the main objective of this chapter is to present the 
latest in the series of measures adopted by the IMO for implementation of IMO 
instruments by Member States: the IMSAS. This chapter discusses the introduction of the 
new Scheme, provides an overview of its principal characteristics, and the results of 
implementation of the Scheme before discussing associated concerns. 
5.1 IMSAS - New instruments for implementation of IMO instruments 
Since the adoption of the Resolution A.1018 (26), there have been many different changes 
in the instruments related to the IMO Audit Scheme and the framework approached was 
the one established in that resolution (Seo, 2010). 
 
Starting from the III Code, explained in Chapter 4, it was modified because of the 
Resolution A.1070 (28) (IMO, 2013c). This last modification is considered the most 
important one due to the amendments proposed and introduced into the instruments 
covered by the Audit Scheme, this III Code became “mandatory”, following the success 
of VIMSAS (Basaran, 2016). 
 
The III Code is not specifically drawn up to deal with IMSAS. It instead elaborates on 
how to correctly implement all IMO legislation. Because of the fact that IMSAS is 
incorporated into the major IMO Conventions - and the III Code applies to these major 
Conventions - the III Code is applicable to IMSAS (Candidate nr. 11, 2015). 
 
In Chapter 4, it was also explained that the III Code was established as the “Audit 
Standard” whereas the Framework and Procedures was created to describe the objective, 
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principles, scope, responsibilities and capacity-building aspect of the IMO Member State 
audit and together constitute the strategy for the audit scheme.  
 
However, during its 28th Session in December 2013, the Assembly approved the new, and 
current, version of the Framework and Procedures by the Resolution A.1067 (28). It was 
considered necessary because the amendments introduced in the most important IMO 
instruments were going to make the III Code mandatory; therefore, this instrument should 
support it properly (IMO, 2013a). 
 
Another important decision taken by the Assembly during its 28th session was the adoption 
of the Resolution A.1068 (28), providing the needed clarifications on how to proceed from 
the VIMSAS to the IMSAS. It established that until the amendments of the applicable 
IMO documents enter into force, the instruments used to conduct the IMO Audit Scheme 
are going to be the “new” ones. However, what is important to highlight is that the process 
of the audit is going to be exactly the same used during the VIMSAS (IMO, 2013b). 
5.2 Amendments to related IMO Instruments 
The time frame contained in the analyzed Resolution A.1018 (26) delegated the functions 
of the adoption of amendments to the instruments related to the IMO Audit Scheme to the 
Committees. For that reason, since 2013 the different committees started to design the 
proper text to be included in the instruments to make the Audit Scheme mandatory and, 
therefore, all the related instruments (Seo, 2010). 
 
These amendments were intended to enter into force on the 1st January 2015, but finally 
it happened a year later with the exception of the LL and Tonnage Convention as they 
have a different process to be amended; therefore, they need a resolution from the 
Assembly to complete it, which was approved during the 28th session (Resolutions A.1082 
(28) and A.1084 (28) respectively) (IMO, 2013d) (IMO, 2013e) (see Appendix I). 
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5.3 Other relevant instruments developed by IMO 
Two other instruments developed by the IMO are particularly useful and relevant in 
implementation of the audit scheme namely, the non-exhaustive list of obligations under 
IMO instruments and the Auditors Manual. 
 
The first instrument was adopted with Resolution A.1077 (28), “The 2013 Non-exhaustive 
list of obligations under instruments relevant to the IMO Instruments Implementation 
Code (hereafter referred to as the "Non-exhaustive list of obligations")”. 
 
This instrument is considered one of the most important aids that every Member State can 
use during the preparation for the IMO Audit together with the Pre-Audit Questionnaire 
(PAQ) (Republic of Argentina, 2009). It consists of a list of “almost” every obligation that 
a Government has assumed by the ratification of the IMO instruments scoped in the Audit 
Scheme, divided by into four analyzed categories. By using the exhaustive list, a Member 
can individualize internal responsibilities and the method implemented to enforce those 
obligations.  
 
Moreover, after the entry into force of the amendments to the IMO instruments, the non-
exhaustive list of obligations has undergone several modifications, and the current list was 
approved during the 29th Session of the Assembly through Resolution A.1105 (29) (IMO, 
2015). 
 
The second instrument was transmitted to every Member State through the Circular N° 
3425 (5 December 2013) “the Auditor's Manual for the IMO Member State Audit Scheme 
(IMSAS)”. This consists of an instrument that was approved by the Council during its 
110th session and it has been developed as a guidance to assist in the planning, conducting 
and reporting by auditors in the execution of their duties as defined in the Framework and 




This instrument has no other intention than be a helpful tool to be used together with the 
Framework and Procedures during the audit itself. However, it could also be considered 
as a tool for the member States in their preparation to receive the Audit. 
5.4 The IMSAS Scheme 
As agreed in Resolution A.1018 (26) the “mandatory” Audit Scheme started on 1st January 
2016, following the list approved by the Council during it 112th Session, where the SG 
had determined the audit schedule for implementation of audits under the mandatory 
Scheme. This was based on a random drawing with the member States and Associate 
Members who had not completed an audit under the voluntary Scheme, followed by those 
that had completed an audit in chronological order. That audit schedule presents the order 
of audits chronologically and the objective is that under the mandatory Scheme, audits 
will be conducted at periodic intervals not exceeding seven years (Secretary General, 
2014). 
5.5 First results of IMSAS 
During 2016, a total of 18 audits were conducted under IMSAS according to the 
Framework and Procedures for the IMSAS and using the III Code as the audit standard. 
 
The first report was transmitted by the SG vide Circular N° 3772, containing the 
consolidated audit summary report (CASR) (see Appendix J). Considering that the CASR 
became a valuable tool for the member States as they can find in them lessons learnt by 
others and challenges in the process of implementation of the international IMO 
instruments, the SG decided to continue with the dissemination of them via Circular 
Letters ensuring the overall coverage (IMO, 2017). 
 
Through Circular N° 3879 of 10 October 2018, the SG provided the most recent 
information about the Audit Scheme, providing the second CASR, containing lessons 
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learned from one audit completed in 2016 and fourteen audits that were completed in 
2017. This information has not yet been analyzed by the III due to the lack of time to do 
so before the 6th session; therefore, it will be presented in the next session (IMO, 2018). 
However, its analysis will be conducted and included in Chapter 7. 
5.6 Practical implementation of IMSAS 
Recently, China presented the document III 6/7/1 analyzing the difficulties in the 
implementation of the provision of the III Code encountered by flag States and proposed 
a manual to assist in its implementation (China, 2019). 
 
Document III 5/7 provided the summary of the analysis of the first CASR from 18 audits 
conducted under the IMSAS. Therefore, China considered that document and the Circular 
N° 3772 to highlight that the most recurrent findings are in the flag States area from 
mandatory audits. They also concluded that an important reason for the difficulties in 
implementation within the mentioned area is related to the differences in understanding 
of the provisions of the III Code by flag States (Secretariat, 2018). 
 
The document III 6/7/1 provides examples of different interpretation of the prescription 
contained in the III Code that an NMA or an Auditor could have and aiming to reduce 
administrative burden of the IMO Secretariat and the flag States. Further, the document 
promotes the effective implementation of the mandatory IMO instruments, recommends 
the III to consider the necessity and feasibility of developing a manual on the 
implementation of the III Code by flag States. 
 
Taking into consideration this document together with the document III 6/INF.9 
(presented by Canada, Denmark, Jamaica, the Netherlands and the United States) the III 
decided to develop a justification for a new output, with a view to developing additional 
guidance in relation to IMSAS to assist in the implementation of the III Code by Member 
States for submission to MEPC 75 and MSC 102. 
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The III6/INF.9 contained a draft Member State Manual for the IMSAS, aiming to assist 
Member States in the implementation of the III Code, as well as the effective preparation 
for the conduct of, and reporting from audits under the Scheme. The Sub-Committee 
agreed that the proposed guidance should be non-mandatory and developed it in a non-
prescriptive manner to allow for the necessary flexibility in its use by Member States 
(Canada, Denmark, Jamaica, Netherlands and United States, 2019). 
 
Finally, the Subcommittee requested the Committees to consider the inclusion of a new 
output on "Development of guidance in relation to IMSAS to assist in the implementation 
of the III Code by Member States" for inclusion in the biennial agenda for 2020-2021 and 
the provisional agendas for III 7 and 8 (Report of the Drafting Group, 2019). 
5.7 First years of IMSAS 
The IMSAS has become “mandatory” since 2016, however, most of the instruments 
amendments were NOT yet in force, as it can be seen in Appendix I. However, the 
schedule proposed by the SG and approved by the Council was implemented that very 
year.  
 
19 audits have been conducted as per the approved schedule. Results of 18 of these audits 
are contained in the first CASR and the remaining one in the second report. The year 2017 
witnessed 14 audits, according to information contained in the second CASR. This may 
be seen as a problem because the main objective of the Scheme since it was established 
was to conduct an audit of every Member State, every seven years. Taking into account 
that there are 174 Members, around 25 should be conducted yearly to comply with this 
aim. 
 
As it was expressed, the first analysis made to the CASR raised the concern of some 
Member States arguing that the interpretation of the III Code is not the same from the 
point of view of the Government as the one used by the auditors (China, 2019). This 
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situation is currently being addressed by the III and may result in the appearance of a new 
instrument to guide the audits. 
 
The real situation is that not every Member State is convinced of the measure adopted by 
the IMO. Therefore, the IMO is still working on the acceptance of the measure that was 
first adopted as a voluntary scheme 13 years ago to gain experience and changed in status 
to a mandatory one three years ago. 
 
Nevertheless, by now the maritime community will agree that the idea expressed by the 
SG at that moment (2004) Mr. Efthimios E. Mitropoulos was correct when he declared 
that the battle against the substandard ships needed an external monitoring system to 
succeed, at that time he ensured (Wolters Kluwer Legal & Regulatory, 2004). 
 
As a result of the audit Scheme, not only can an audited Member State identify its 
shortcomings, but other Member States can also benefit from the outcome of another 
State’s audit and use it to implement and enforce IMO legislation in a better way (Barchue, 
2009). 
 
When all the IMO Member States act in accordance with the IMO instruments the result 
is that globally there will be more homogeneity in international regulations regarding 
shipping and safety (Candidate nr. 11, 2015). 
 
The IMSAS seems to be a renovated and promising tool for IMO in its battle against 
substandard ships; however, it would be preferable to consider that the current status is 
somewhat premature to draw conclusions about its effectiveness. The analysis conducted 







Chapter 6 – Research Methodology 
 
6.1 Research method 
This dissertation used a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. The analysis was 
conducted by using three main sources, each of them related to each of the main measures 
adopted by the IMO as follows: 
 
Moreover, to place the attention on a reduced population, a questionnaire was 
administered to the 16 Member States of the VMA: Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State 
of), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of). 
 
The questionnaire was originally designed in English; however, due to the language used 
by the recipients, it was translated into Spanish and Portuguese by professional personnel 
of the International Affairs Office of Prefectura Naval Argentina. (see Appendix K) 
6.2 Period of time and hypothesis 










“The measures adopted by the International Maritime Organization (MOUs, 
VIMSAS and IMSAS) have been an efficient form to eradicate the substandard 
ships and enhance the maritime safety” 
 
As the VIMSAS started in 2006, the period of time considered for the dissertation is from 
2006 until 2017, resulting in a total of 12 years. The last year considered is 2017 because 
it is the one with the available information from IMSAS and MOU´s. 
6.3 Data analysis and indicators 
Through the analysis of the information contained in the mentioned sources, some data 
was extracted to develop a set of indicators. 
 




Based on the MOU reports, CASR under VIMSAS and IMSAS and the Questionnaire 
survey, a total of 19 indicators were developed as described below  
 
 





Figure 4- Development of indicators 
 
6.4 Main research question 
How efficient have the measures adopted by the International Maritime Organization 
(MOUs, VIMSAS and IMSAS) been in its “battle” to eradicate the substandard ships and 
enhancing the maritime safety? 
6.5 Another research question 
 
 How are the measures adopted by IMO (MOUs, VIMSAS and IMSAS) impacting 







Chapter 7 – Analysis and findings 
This chapter presents the results of the analysis conducted, following the methodology 
explained in the previous chapter. To maintain an order, these results will be laid out 
following the sequence of the number of the indicators. For that reason, the first ones will 
be related to the MOU, then VIMSAS, IMSAS and finally those related to the 
questionnaires. 
7.1 Analysis of MOU - Overall Analysis 
In this section the analysis is conducted based on the “Annual Reports”, for the established 
period (2006 – 2017), provided by every MOU and published in their websites. The 
analysis will be conducted from the general information to the one related directly to the 
ships flagged with flags from the Members of the Viña del Mar Agreement (VMA). There 
will be an analysis of MOU by MOU following the alphabetical order of the MOU´s name 
(see Appendix L), but the overall information is contained in this chapter, allowing the 
development of the indicators.  
7.1.1 I1 - Detention Rate 
Figure 5 depicts the yearly detention rate of the 10 MOU´s during the analyzed period 
expressed in percentage, constructed as follows: 
Detention Rate = (number of detentions / number of inspections) * 100 
 
The detention rate (Indicator 1) of the 10 MOU´s shows that most of them are 
experiencing a decreasing trend, which can be also explained as a success of the aim that 
the IMO established by supporting the development of the MOU´s: “eradicate the 
existence of substandard ships”. This indicator can be interpreted as decrement of the 
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number of the substandard ships because it can also be seen that the number of inspections 
have been constant or even increasing yearly. 
 
Figure 5- Annual PSC Detention Rate of each MOU (%) 
Figure 6 shows the combined average detention rate in percentage of the 10 MOU´s. It is 
in not more than the average of the detention rates of the 10 MOU´s per year, in a single 
line, showing that the first impression while observing the previous figure is totally real, 
and the I1 can be considered as a point in favor for the IMO. It shows that the average 






















Figure 6- Average PSC Detention Rate of 10 MOU´s (%) 
7.1.2 I2 - Main causes of deficiencies detected 
For the second indicator, 2 main causes of deficiencies were identified per report (see 
Appendix L). Then, considering only the main cause a total of 103 figures over 120 were 
analyzed, as some information was not available. As a result of the analysis a total of 12 
different categories have been observed (see Appendix M). 
 
Figure 7 shows that the category “Fire Safety System” is the one that has appeared as the 
most common cause of deficiencies in the period under review. It appeared in 37 occasions 
(years) in 6 different MOUs. The second highest detected cause was the category “Safety 
of Navigation”, in 30 instances. For that reason, the Indicator 2 showed that the most 















Figure 7- Main causes of deficiencies detected by PSC in the analyzed period 
7.1.3 I3 - Deficiencies rate of VMA fleet expressed in percentage 
In order to analyze the performance of the VMA Fleet it was considered over the total the 
inspections conducted yearly by each MOU the ones issued to these ships. Considering 
this number as a whole, the number those inspections containing deficiencies was 
analyzed and expressed as a percentage: 
Deficiencies rate of VMA ships = (inspections with deficiencies / inspections of 
VMA flag ships) * 100 
 
Figure 8 shows the deficiencies rate of the VMA Fleet in every MOU during the period 
analyzed. This rate represents the probability for a ship flagged with one of these flags to 
have a deficiency during a PSC inspection. It can be seen that, in general, the 10 lines 
showed that the chance to find a deficiency is decreasing yearly. 
















Figure 8- Deficiencies Rate of VMA Fleet in the 10 MOU´s (%) 
To make the analysis more comprehensive and easy to interpret, Figure 9 provides the 
graph of the average of the deficiencies rate observed in the 10 MOU´s. In this graph, it 
is easily observed that the Indicator 3 also shows that the measure adopted by the IMO 
has a positive result eradicating the existence of substandard ships, considering only the 
flags of the Latin-American region. 
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7.1.4 I4: Deficiencies rate of VMA fleet expressed in percentage 
This indicator is calculated similarly to the I3, analyzing the detentions of VMA flagged 
ships conducted yearly per each MOU over the number of those ships inspected: 
Detention rate of VMA flagged ships = (detentions / inspections of VMA flag 
ships) * 100 
 
This analysis in conducted with the information of the 10 MOUs and the result can be 
observed in Figure 10. It shows that, in general the performance of the VMA ships is 
increasing as the detention rate is decreasing since the beginning of the period until the 
last years analyzed. 
 
Figure 10 - Detention Rate of VMA Fleet in the 10 MOU´s (%) 
To provide a better picture of the situation, Figure 11 shows the yearly average of every 
MOU´s detention rate for VMA flagged ships. It clearly shows that the performance of 
those ships is increasing yearly reaching a minimum of 3% in 2017. Therefore, as smaller 
the indicator 4 is, the better standard those ships are showing to the PSC in the world, 















Figure 11 - Average of the Detention Rate of VMA Fleet considering the 10 MOU´s (%) 
7.2 Analysis of VIMSAS CASR 
In this section, there will be an analysis of the audits that have been done during the 
VIMSAS. However, only for the purpose of the analysis, the VIMSAS audit will be 
considered together with the audits during the transitional period. Therefore, the following 
information will be the result of a total of 75 audits (59 from VIMSAS period and 16 from 
the transitional period). The audits covered 67 Member States (one Member twice), two 
Associate Members and five dependent territories. 
 
The outcomes of the audits have been provided periodically by the IMO through several 
documents that can be seen in table 54 (see Appendix N), as well as the number of audits 
contained in them. 
 
Through the analysis of the information, it was observed that there was a total of 762 
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Relevant information to highlight is the definition of “findings”. In this section audits from 
VIMSAS and transitional period are analyzed together, but as it was explained in Chapter 
4, the standard for the process was different.  
 
Therefore, it should be noted that the term "non-conformity" had been used for non-
compliance with the requirements contained in the mandatory IMO instruments in audits 
under VIMSAS, whilst in audits under the transitional period the term "finding" had been 
used to describe the same non-compliance.  
 
However, in this analysis, the term "non-conformity" has been used to denote a non-
compliance with the mandatory requirements for the whole data set. Moreover, in both 
cases, the term "observation" has been used for the lack of implementation of non-
mandatory requirements of the Code and the III Code, as audits under the transitional 
arrangements were carried out prior to the entry into force of the amendments to the 
mandatory IMO instruments making the use of the III Code mandatory. (IMO, 2013a) 
Finally, the term "finding" has been used in this analysis to denote both non-conformity 
and observation collectively. 
7.2.1 I5 - Average number of findings per audit 
As it was explained, during the analyzed period that started in 2006 with the first audit, a 
total of 75 audits until the last day of 2015 have been done because as explained in Chapter 
5, since the 1st January 2016, the IMSAS began. During these audits a total of 762 findings 
has been detected, which means that per audit there is an average of 10.2 findings during 
this period. 
 
There is also a division of the finding into non-compliance with the IMO instruments and 
observations. Therefore, the average number of findings per audit is around 4 non-





Figure 12 – Discrimination of the findings during VIMSAS into non-conformities and 
observations 
7.2.2 I6 - Number of findings as a Flag State 
As explained in Chapters 3 and 4, the III Code divided the findings/obligations into four 
main categories: Common Areas, Flag State, Coastal State, and Port State. Each Member 
State views the Code according to its own circumstances. By virtue of geography and 
circumstances, some States may have a greater role as a flag State than as a port State or 
as a coastal State and vice versa. 
 
Figure 13 shows the breakup of the findings found during the VIMSAS process according 







Figure 13 - Total findings during VIMSAS divided into the 4 main categories of the III 
Code 
From Figure 13, it is evident that the main area of findings is the “Flag State”. Therefore, 
the indicator 6 concluded that over the total of findings more than 50% of them are related 
to this category.  
 
Following the result provided by the I6, the analysis will continue with the findings 
detected in the main area only, focusing the attention on “Flag State”. Figure 14 shows 
the distinction between non-compliances and observations in the category. It can be 
observed that most of the findings in this categories have been observations, which means 
that the Member States audited have experienced difficulty in complying with obligations 
that are not contained in the main IMO mandatory instruments, but with the 
recommendatory ones. However, a deep analysis of the main causes of these findings will 









Figure 14 - Flag States findings discriminated into non-conformities and observations 
during VIMSAS 
7.2.3 I7 - Categorization of Flag State findings during VIMSAS 
In the same way, the III Code divides the obligations into 4 categories, and within the 
“Flag State” category, it divides the Member State obligations into 6 other sub-categories. 
Figure 15 provides the information about the number of findings in each sub-category. 
 
Figure 15 - Flag State findings in VIMSAS divided into the sub-categories 
Here it can be seen that the indicator 7 shows that the main cause on finding as Flag State 
is problem with the implementation of the instruments. Moreover, in this sub-category, 














and enforcement of the requirements, and of administrative instructions to implement 
applicable international rules and regulations. Further, documentation and provision of 
guidance concerning mandatory requirements that are left to the satisfaction of the 
Administration are elements that need to be addressed by flag States. In addition, there are 
some findings related to resources to ensure compliance with the requirements of the 
mandatory IMO instruments. 
 
If these results are considered together with the previously analyzed results of the MOU´s 
trends, an interesting relationship can be found between them. The MOU´s results showed 
that one of the main problems detected on-board as deficiencies was implementation in 
the regulation for the safety of the ships itself, such as propulsion and emergency engine, 
regulation to ensure the safety of navigation and also the certificates issued by the 
Authorities. Therefore, if the results of the indicator 7 are taken into consideration, it can 
be seen that the flag States are facing problems in implementing the international 
legislation (34%), but also as a second reason (21%) delegation of authority. Going back 
to what was explained in Chapter 2, the problem with delegation of authority was the main 
issue that allowed the appearance of the substandard ships.  
 
In conclusion, it can be seen a relationship between the results of the indicators detailed, 
there is a connection between what the PSC finds and the problems that the Member States 
are facing during the audits. The implementation of the international legislation seems to 
be the key to it, according to figures shown by the indicator 7. 
7.3 Analysis IMSAS CASR 
As explained in Chapter 5, IMSAS started on 1st January 2016. Since that moment, and 
through the amendments of the main IMO instruments, the III Code became mandatory. 
Therefore, some of the findings during VIMSAS were considered as “observation” in this 
context are considered as “non-conformities”. Also, it should be noted that the term “non-




Another interesting point to highlight in the change of status of the scheme is that currently 
every part of the NMA should be considered compulsory during the process, which 
previously was not mandatory. Until the date of this analysis, the outcomes of 33 audits 
within the “new” framework have been published (see Appendix O). 
7.3.1 I8 - Average number of findings per audit  
From the analysis, it can be observed that during the 33 audits conducted during 2016 and 
2017, 524 non-compliances have been detected. This number means that there was an 
average of 15.8 findings per audit. This number is also larger than the average detected 
during VIMSAS. 
In addition, that number can be divided into findings and observations, noting that this 
time, for IMSAS the results are totally different. There have been 483 findings and only 
41 observations. As can be seen in Figure 16, there are many more findings than 
observations, mainly due to the change of status of the III Code. 
 







7.3.2 I9 - Number of findings as a Flag State  
During IMSAS, the new III Code continues with the same structure; therefore, the non-
compliances can be also divided into the 4 main categories of obligations: Common Areas, 
Flag State, Coastal State, and Port State. 
 
Figure 17 - Total findings during IMSAS divided into the 4 main categories of the III 
Code  
Analyzing Figure 17, it can be seen that the division of the non-compliances into the 4 
categories changed compared during VIMSAS. The trend is still the same where the 
number of non-compliances in the flag State category is the most relevant. However, the 
percentage of Flag State related findings is reduced, with a corresponding increase in the 
percentage of finding as Coastal State and Port State. 
 
It is difficult to provide an explanation of this trend for many reasons. First of all, the 
analysis is being done over different Member States, where their geographical location 
and structure are not the same. Secondly, the population analyzed does not consist in the 
same number of countries. Lastly, the framework during VIMSAS and IMSAS is not the 










Nonetheless, the analysis showed that the flag State obligations are still the weak point of 
most of the NMA and that is why the largest number of non-compliances are appearing in 
this category. 
 
To conclude the analysis of IMSAS, an observation on the sub-categories of the Flag 
States non-compliances will be conducted to determine which one is the most relevant, in 
Figure 19. 
 









Figure 19 - Flag State findings in IMSAS divided into the sub-categories 
7.3.3 I10 - Categorization of Flag State findings during VIMSAS  
Figure 19 helped to analyze that the indicator 10 has the same results as the indicator 7. It 
means that during VIMSAS and IMSAS the main reason of non-compliances as flag State 
for the Governments is due to the implementation. Incidentally, it can be seen that the 
percentage of findings related to implementation vis-à-vis the overall non-compliances is 
exactly the same, 34%. However, changes are observed in the other categories, for 
example, there was a reduction in the non-compliances related to the delegation of 
authority. For this, there can be two explanations: one is the entry into force of the RO 
Code in its mandatory status. However, without the chance to know the Member State this 
cannot be assumed because the other possible reason is that the States audited are not 
delegating as many obligations as the ones observed during VIMSAS. 
 
The sub-category that suffered an increase was enforcement and mainly due to the absence 
of appropriate national legal provisions, internal directives, and human resources to ensure 











It is very difficult to make a comparison between VIMSAS and IMSAS for all the reason 
explained previously; however, by way of analysis of the information, some preliminary 
conclusions can be reached: 
 
The Member States are experiencing difficulties to comply with the international 
regulation, mainly as flag States. This problem has been observed during VIMSAS and 
also in IMSAS. Moreover, the main reason for this problem appears to be lack of 
implementation. Also, the delegation of authority appears in both periods as the second 
main reason. 
 
If both reasons are taken together with the results of the PSC deficiencies observed during 
the analysis of the MOU´s reports, it is the conclusion that this lack of implementation 
and control on the delegation of authority is what is contributing to the existence of the 
substandard ships.  
 
It is too premature to confirm that the Audit Scheme is contributing to the decrease of the 
number of substandard ships navigations along the world oceans; however, once the cycle 
of the audit is finished, a better analysis could be conducted. In addition, the analysis of 
the information obtained by the questionnaire that will be conducted in the following 
section will also contribute to understanding the changes what the measures are producing 
in the NMA. 
7.4 Analysis of Questionnaires 
The questionnaire was sent to the 16 members of VMA and answers were received from 
8 of them. The information contained in some cases is not complete; however, the analysis 
is going to be conducted in this section. To ensure the confidentiality of the information 
the members are simply identified as A – H. The answers have been provided by members 
of institutions which are part of the NMA with the majority of the functions. 
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7.4.1 I11 - Relationship between VMA fleet and PSC findings  
I4 showed that the average detention rate for the ships flagged with VMA Flags 
considering the 10 MOUs is currently (2017) around 3%. While I3 showed that the 
deficiencies rate for those ships is around 40%. 
 
Considering that information and adding the numbers of international flagged ships 
provided by the members, it can be concluded that there are in total 7847 international 
ships flagged for them, and 235 of them can be detained during a PSC, while 3138 of them 
can have a deficiency. This is a significant number as it represents around 15% of the 
international fleet. Figure 20 shows the ships flagged for each country and estimated 
deficiencies and detention rate for each of them based on I3 and I4. 
 
Figure 20 - Number of international ships flagged and relationship with the VMA 
detention and deficiencies rates (I3 and I4) 
 



























This figure helps to visualize in a single graph the relevance of the average rates analyzed 
from the PSC annual reports (I3 and I4) for VMA ships and contrast them with the number 
of international ships flagged currently by them. 
7.4.2 I12 - Relationship between VMA fleet and RO´s agreements 
Of the 8 members that filled out the questionnaire, only 4 had an agreement with RO´s. 
As can be seen in Figure 21, 3 over these members have a rate of 30% of the ships for 
each RO´s while the remaining one is much lower due to the huge number of ships flagged. 
This indicator, in principle, shows that not every regional country is delegating the 
obligations in RO´s.  
 





































Moreover, other important detail of this indicator is the date of those agreements because 
as can be seen in Figure 22, most of them have been issued in the last years. The reasons 
can be due to the entry into force of the RO Code or to adapt the legislation to the audit 
standard.  
 
Figure 22 – VMA Members RO´s agreement per year 
Figure 23 shows the years in which each of the member signed the contracted with the 
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Figure 23 – Number of RO´s agreements per year 
7.4.3 I13 - Relationship between VMA fleet and Flag State inspectors 
This indicator analyzed the information of 6 countries and it can be seen in Figure 24 that 
3 of them have more flag inspector than international ships. However, regarding the other 
3 countries, 2 of them have almost 1 flag inspector per ships and for the remaining one, 
the average is very small due to the number of ships flagged.  
 
This indicator partially agreed with the analysis of VIMSAS and IMSAS information 
where the findings regarding flag inspectors, as a sub-category of flag States findings, was 
not one of the most relevant ones. It can be said that the VMA members seem to have a 













Figure 24 - International flagged ships and Flag Inspectors per VMA Member 
7.4.4 I14 - Relationship between number of Flag State inspectors and inspections 
This indicator shows the variation of the number of inspections and the number of flag 
Inspectors that all VMA member had during the period of time analyzed. Figure 25 shows 
that both figures have increased significantly since 2013, reaching levels three times 
higher than in the previous years. In principle, the analysis is not scoped to understand the 
reason of this effect; however, it can be assumed that the VMA members, during that year, 
decided to incorporate or train more personnel to fulfill the obligations as flag State 

































Figure 25 - Number of Flag Inspectors and Flag inspections of all the VMA Member 
during the period of time analyzed 
On the other hand, Figure 26 shows the ratio of inspections per flag inspector, noting that 
it is experiencing a notable increment, which means that every flag inspector is conducting 
more inspections yearly. 
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This situation is not fully covered by the analysis conducted, nevertheless, it can be 
assumed that the possible reason for the increment is due to the implementation of higher 
and stricter regulations as flag State, resulting in the need for every inspector to conduct 
around 180 inspections per year (2017). 
7.4.5 I15 - Relationship between number of PSCOs and PSC inspections 
Figure 27 provides the figures regarding the number of PSCOs of the VMA members 
compared with the number of inspections conducted by them per year, during the period 
analyzed.  
 
The number of inspections was almost constant during the period and it can be attributed 
to the obligation that every MOU has been trying to reach a fixed percentage of inspections 
over ships received. On the other hand, the number of PSCO saw a notable increment 
since 2009 until reaching a stable level since 2013. This situation can be also attributed to 
stricter regulations of the VMA members and to the development of regional training 
courses to form inspectors. 
 
Figure 27 - Number of PSCO and inspections of all the VMA Member during the period 


























Figure 28, shows how the ratio of inspection per PSCO declined significantly during the 
last 7 years. This allows the PSCOs to conduct more detailed inspections and avoid an 
overload of inspections per person. 
 
Figure 28 - Ratio of inspections per PSCO in VMA Members 
7.4.6 I16 - Intervention of the NMA in the detentions 
Regarding this indicator, only 4 out of the 8 countries provided information. From its 
analysis, it can be observed in Figure 29 that the majority of the detentions suffered for 
ships flagged with a flag of the VMA Members were undertaken with the participation of 














Figure 29 - Interventions of NMA or RO´s when a VMA flagged ship is detained 
7.4.7 I17 - Number of persons in charge of the implementation of the international 
legislation in the NMA 
Unfortunately, the information provided for the 8 countries did not contain this numbers, 
therefore, this indicator could not be established. 
7.4.8 I18 - Time lag between the entry into force and ratification 
This indicator aims to show the time needed for the countries to ratify the international 
instruments observed during the IMO audits. Figure 30 shows the average in years that 
the analyzed member States lasted in ratifying each of the instruments. Depending on the 
instrument this number goes between the 2 years and 9, while the average is 5,6 years. 
 
It was not the aim of the analysis but it can be observed that MARPOL Convention is the 
instrument that took longer time to be ratified for the VMA members. The reason for this 




















Figure 30 - Average time lag of VMA Members between entry into force of instrument 
and ratification (years) 
7.4.9 I19 - Time lag between the ratification and the national implementation 
This indicator is related to the previous one, but in this case it considers the time lag 
between the ratification of the international instrument and the final national 
implementation. It can be affirmed that the average is around 60 days if the exceptions of 
LL 1966 and STCW conventions are not considered. Those exceptions were due to 
extraordinary political situations experienced in the region. On the other hand, there are 
some examples such as COLREG whose average to be implemented was only 10 days as 































Figure 31 - Average time lag of VMA Member between ratification of instrument and 
implementation (days) 
7.4.10 Further findings from the questionnaires 
From the overall analysis of the indicators related to the questionnaire, some partial 
conclusion can be conducted. To do so, it should be firstly considered that the VMA has 
16 members and the answers are from 8 of them. Secondly, some of the answers were not 
complete. Thirdly, the obligation of the countries varies according to their geographical 
location. 
 
However, it can be highlighted that all of them are IMO members and 7 of them have been 
audited during VIMSAS and the remaining during IMSAS, which shows the proactive 
attitude of the region. Regarding the findings during the audits, the information shows that 

































Figure 32 - Area of the audit findings informed in the questionnaires by the VMA 
Members 
It shows that the percentage of the findings correspond with the general results of 
VIMSAS and also IMSAS, expressed in indicators 6 and 9, where the flag State seems to 
be the main issue. However, due to the analysis of previous indicators and the number of 
ships flagged by members of VMA, in general, the standard of them is high. 
 
Regarding the composition of the NMA´s the analysis shows that the number of RO´s 
agreement is not high and neither is the number of cases in which these RO´s intervene 
during a detention. In addition to the increment of the number of flag inspectors that in 
general the NMA´s have shown, it means that the region is trying to maintain its duties 
with its own personnel and avoiding the delegation of authority despite the fact that the 
number of agreements showed an increment in the last 3 years. 
 
Finally, the average gaps for ratification or implementation show that the region, in 
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the ratification, while the implementation will be fulfilled in an average lap of time of 100 
days. 
7.5 Summary of findings through the use of indicators 
In order to provide a clearer picture of the findings obtained through the use of the 19 
indicators Figure 33 will briefly summarize them as follows: 
 







Chapter 8 – Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
8.1 Conclusions 
Evidently, to conclude this dissertation it is highly necessary to remember the assumption 
made at the beginning of it:  
“The measures adopted by the International Maritime Organization (MOUs, 
VIMSAS and IMSAS) have been an efficient form to eradicate the substandard 
ships and enhance the maritime safety” 
 
At this point, as the analysis of each measure adopted by the IMO has been finished the 
conclusion may not be entirely conclusive.  
 
First of all, the IMO made huge efforts to help in the development of the MOU on Port 
State Control supporting the efforts of the European States through the establishment of 
the Paris MOU in 1982, despite the resistance of the USSR (Blanco-Bazán, 2004). 
Currently, 10 MOU´s are found all over the world, working in a regional way to comply 
with the aim to eradicate substandard ships from their area.  
 
The results analyzed in Chapter 7 showed that, during the period of time established, 
almost in every MOU the detention rate is decreasing (I1), as well as the average rate. The 
situation was prematurely observed during the first years of the Paris and Tokyo MOUs. 
(Bang, 2008) There are two different strategies to obtain those results, ie the first one is to 
reduce the quality of the inspections and the second one is to receive ships that are 
complying with the international standards and, therefore, they cannot be detained. It is 
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hard to believe that the first option has been chosen by every MOU because it supposes a 
high level of coordination in reducing the level of inspections, accepting ships that are not 
totally safe, something that could almost be considered as against the ethic code of the 
inspectors. For that reason, the results allow concluding that the decrement in the detention 
rate is due to an improvement in the level of the overall standard of the ships that are 
navigating daily around the world. This first conclusion can be seen as a triumph for the 
IMO. 
 
In addition, another rate was also analyzed in that Chapter, namely Deficiencies Rate. This 
is another important indicator to be analyzed because it showed that the probability of 
having deficiencies for a ship calling a foreign port is also decreasing. That also showed 
that the quality of the ships has been improving yearly. 
 
The situation of the VMA fleet is not isolated from the general context. Both, the detention 
rate and the deficiencies rate, showed to be in a decreasing trend along the analyzed period 
(I3 and I4). Therefore, it can be concluded that the work of the Maritime Authorities 
Members of VMA are doing a huge effort to comply with the international standards on 
their fleet. 
 
The analysis of VIMSAS was also important because it allowed identifying the areas in 
which the majority of the Member States are facing the biggest number of difficulties. The 
flag States´ obligations appeared as the most challenging ones for the Member States that 
voluntarily have been faced the Audit Scheme (I6). Furthermore, while getting deeper into 
the causes of this situation, it was showed that problems in the implementation of the 
international legislation are the most substantial issue for the States, together with the 
delegation of authority (I7). It is important also to bear in mind that during VIMSAS only 




The IMO understood that the experience gained during VIMSAS was helpful to identify 
and help the Member States to correct those deficiencies; therefore, since 2016, the 
mandatory status of the Audit Scheme allowed the development of IMSAS. Until this 
moment, 33 Member States have been audited in this new version of the Scheme. 
However, the results showed the same trend as that in VIMSAS, around 34% of the non-
compliances are related to flag States obligations (I9).  
 
Obviously, there is a relationship between the trend analyzed in the information provided 
by the MOUs and the VIMSAS/IMSAS results. The Member States are facing problems 
in implementing the international regulations, and in particular problems dealing with the 
existence of ships that are not complying with the rules: “substandard ships”. 
 
The questionnaire conducted to VMA members, in addition to the trends observed, 
showed that the Member States are working hard to comply with the international 
legislation in the region. The results of VIMSAS/IMSAS are a very useful tool that allows 
them to identify the areas in which others are facing difficulties and trying to improve 
them. 
 
To provide a better picture of this Figure 34 show the detention rates trends of the oldest 
four MOUs and its comparison with the VMA fleet detention rate trend in the 10 MOUs. 
As can be seen, the VMA fleet detention rate trend is the one which has the biggest 
proportion of variance (0,8511). In other words, the VMA fleet is the one that during the 





Figure 34 - Detention Rate Trend comparison between four MOU and VMA fleet 
8.2 Recommendations 
The analysis can be considered as helpful and hopeful because it showed that the standards 
of the ships are getting better and it also highlights some points that the Member States 
should consider to improve it. 
 
However, to have an overall image of the real situation a new analysis should be conducted 
once the cycle of the audit is complete. As it was explained in Chapter 5, the IMSAS 
established that every country will be audited every 7 years. Considering the 
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will be comparing cycle against another cycle. Therefore, the results of the Audits 
conducted on the total Member States with another period of audits will be analyzed, 
which will allow identifying the aspects that are not showing improvements, so the IMO 
could place the attention on that. 
 
Regarding the MOUs, it was shown that it was a very helpful tool to eradicate the 
substandard ships from the regions; therefore, the IMO should continue the promotion of 
them and every country should consider joining one of them. The results showed by the 
analysis of the VMA fleet can be also considered as an example, where the Member States 
are working hard to ensure that their fleets are complying with the international 
regulations by working regionally. 
 
It could be useful to conduct similar analyses in other regions to identify the main 
problems that the Member States are facing while trying to implement the international 
legislation. Unfortunately, the dissertation is limited in the number of words and time; 
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Appendix A – History of the UNCLOS 
The current text of the UNCLOS is also known as the “UNCLOS III”, because it is the 
third attempt of an international law to control the seas, but its history can be considered 
since 1494. In that year, one of the most striking international agreement related with the 
seas took place and it was called “Treaty of Tordesillas”. Basically, it was due to a 
negotiation between the Ferdinand and Isabella, who were ruling Spain, and the Spanish-
born pope Alexander VI. The main idea was to ensure the exclusive used of the oceans 
based on the recently discovery of the “New World” according Cristopher Columbus´ 
reports. In order to do so, the pope set a line from one pole to the other dividing the water, 
giving the rights to Spain to exploit the west side and to Portugal to continue the 
exploration of the east area. Obviously, no other European nation facing the ocean 
accepted this rules, however, it ruled for almost one century (The Editors of 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). 
 
The discontent of the other countries was growing year by year dealing in many attempt 
to cancel those “rights” provided to 2 countries. For example, in the United Kingdom, the 
Queen Elizabeth (1558 – 1603) alleged that as the air can be used for everyone, nobody 
can have a title of possessions related to the oceans. However, in 1610, King James I. 
orders that fisheries activities “before English waters” are to be conditioned on a 
permission by English authorities. 
 
This period of time was also known as the “war of books” related with the oceans´ rights. 
Famous writers all over the world started to write about the rights on the oceans, one of 
the cases was Hugo Groutis (1583 – 1645) who published the book “Mare Liverum” in 
favor of the liberty on the use of the international waters, that is still being used in many 
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International Tribunal sessions as an example. On the other hand, litterateurs such as John 
Selden (1584-1654) decided to take the contrary position in his book “Mare Clausum”. 
 
The following era was known as the “French Era” (1648 – 1815), where the rights over 
the oceans was closely related to the so called “Ordonnance de la marine”, meaning that 
those nations with bigger military power was ruling the waters. In this period of time 
another of the main definitions established in the actual UNCLOS appeared. Since 1703, 
the definition of the “jurisdictional or internal waters” was applied for some countries and 
was established as the effective distance of a cannon shot, that was considered in 
approximately 3 nautical miles. 
 
The English era is known to be started since the beginning of the 18th century, were the 
British Navy was ruling almost every ocean because of their high developed military fleet. 
Especially, since 1848, those vessels started to stop and control every foreign ship, basing 
this activity only in their fighting power. However, this activity settled the basis of another 
important article of the current UNCLOS, the article number 110 where its establishes the 
right to visit other ships, but it should be done under certain circumstances such as for 
example when there is a clear ground that the ship is related with a pirate activity, slave 
trade or without nationality (Sohn, 2010). 
 
Before the Second World War, there have been many approaches to establish legal rules 
in relation to the oceans´ rights, especially on naval warfare, however, none of them with 
a successful result. Only there was a kind of success on regional treaties such as the 
“Montreux Treaty” (1936). But it was not until the period after the WWII that some further 
codification attempts were developed. Also, the Public International Law slowly started 
to be transformed into a law of coordination and cooperation among States. One of the 
most important legal terms that appeared in this period was the "territorialization” of the 
seas. One of the most famous example of that was the United States´ president Truman 
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proclamation of 1945 related to the Policy of the country with respect to the natural 
Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf. The explanation was that 
the continental shelf may be regarded as an extension of the land-mass of the coastal nation 
and thus naturally appurtenant to it. 
 
Finally, in 1958, during the Geneva Conference the Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS I) was adopted. It was a reaction to the international community request to the 
United Nations International Law Commission. The main objective was to consider the 
codification of the existing laws relating to the oceans. The commission began working 
towards this in 1949 and prepared four draft conventions, which were adopted at the first 
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea: 
 The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone; 
 The Convention on the High Seas; 
 The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High 
Seas;  
 The Convention on the Continental Shelf. 
While considered to be a step forward, the conventions did not establish a maximum 
breadth of the territorial sea. 
 
The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II) from March 
17 until April 26, 1960, was considered as a failure because it did not result in any 
international agreements. The main problem was to fix a uniform breadth for the territorial 
or establish consensus on sovereign fishing rights. 
 
In 1967, during an UN Assembly, the Malta´s UN ambassador Mr. Arvid Pardo delivers 
a famous speech where for the very first time, the term "common heritage of mankind” (in 
particular in relation to the seafloor and subsoil thereof...) was mentioned. 
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Between 1973 and 1982, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III) took place. It addressed the issues bought up at the previous conferences. 
Over 160 nations participated in the 9-year convention, which finally came into force on 
November 14, 1994, 21 years after the first meeting and one year after the ratification by 




Appendix B - Enforcement based on the UNCLOS 
The UNCLOS is considered as one of the most important international agreement related 
with maritime issues, because it sets the basis for the rights and obligations of the 
stakeholders in the maritime community. Those attributes are going to be strongly related 
with the jurisdiction of each country that also will be related with the area defined as it 
was detailed recently. 
 
In order to provide a solution to all this concern, the UNCLOS included as a part XV a 
procedure to settle disputes between States. In its article 279, the instrument encourages 
all the Members to solve the differences in a peaceful form. However, for the cases that a 
final solution could not be reached, it establishes a procedure where the parts has the 
chance to choose for an international independent forum to act as a third part on the dispute 
(United Nation Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), 1982). 
 
In this context, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) was established 
in Hamburg, Germany. The decision taken by this institution are validated by the article 
296, where it is settled that it shall be the final and be complied by all the parts involved 
(International Tribunal for the Law of The Sea (ITLOS), 2019). The mechanism 
established by the Convention provides for four alternative means for the settlement of 
disputes: the ITLOS, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), an arbitral tribunal 
constituted in accordance with Annex VII to the Convention, and a special arbitral tribunal 
constituted in accordance with Annex VIII to the Convention.  
 
The ICJ was established in June 1945, in The Hague, by the Charter of the United Nations 
and began work in April 1946. The ICJ’s role is to settle, in accordance with international 
law, legal disputes submitted to it by States and to give advisory opinions on legal 
questions referred to it by authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies 
(International Court of Justice (ICJ), 2019). 
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And why are these institutions and their decision relevant for every State? Basically, 
because those disputes are related with the jurisdiction that every country is going to have 
under their sovereignty, that means that inside that established limits the “Coastal State” 
will be able to exercise its rights, according what it is established in the article 2 on 
UNCLOS: “The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention 
and to other rules of international law” (United Nation Convention on the Law of the Seas 
(UNCLOS), 1982). 
 
It also establishes some important rights for the Flag States, such as for example the 
“innocent passage” (article 17). It considers that every foreign ship has the right to 
navigate along the jurisdictional water as long as it is complying with the conditions of a 





Appendix C - Developing of IMO Convention 
Understanding the necessity of an international body that can be able to assist in the 
development of the international cooperation in shipping, in 1889 an international 
maritime conference was held in Washington DC, The United States. Historically, it was 
manifested that actions for ships taking refuge in events of hash weather conditions or in 
distress, despite the nationality of it, or the settlement of safety standard for international 
ships, should be centralized and treated in an international forum (Mansell, 2009). 
 
By that time, some other international organizations have already been settled such as the 
International Telegraph (now Telecommunications) Union (established 1865); the 
International (now World) Meteorological Organization (1873); and the Universal Postal 
Union (1874). However, the main idea did not prosper at that time. The objective was 
basically rejected for the Conference stating “for the present the establishment of a 
permanent international maritime commission is not considered expedient”. The reason 
was not clearly explained, however, taking into consideration the period of time and the 
particularities of the economy at that era, it was easy to conclude that the shipping industry 
was doubting that the establishment of an international organization was only aimed to 
become a forum to control and restrict the freedom of the commercial activities in the 
shipping sector (International Maritime Organization (IMO), 2019). 
 
Was not before the end of the Second World War where the plan was retaken. The 
establishment of the United Nations stimulated the development of may international 
specialized organizations. For that reason, The International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) was founded in 1944, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was created 
in 1945, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
in 1945 and the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1947. Therefore, in 1948, a 
conference was held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to establish an international body 
specialized in shipping. It opened in February 1948 and on 6 March 1948 the Convention 
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establishing the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) was 
adopted. That name was used for the Organization until 1982, when it was change to the 
well-known “International Maritime Organization (IMO)”. 
 
The text of the Geneva Convention, known as the “IMO Convention” suffered many 
modifications along the time in order to update its content according the experiences. The 
main objective of the Organization can be found in its article 1: to provide cooperation on 
“technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade”, to 
encourage the removal of discriminatory action and unnecessary restrictions by 
Governments affecting shipping engaged in international trade so as to promote the 
availability of shipping services to the commerce of the world without discrimination, and 
to act as a UN specialized agency in matter concerning shipping. Those statements, 
clearly, prevent the threats that discouraged the first attempt in 1889 (Convention on the 
Maritime International Organization, 1948). 
 
The entrance into force was not an easy issue, in order to do so the convention establishes 
that it will do so "on the date when 21 States, of which seven shall each have a total 
tonnage of not less than 1,000,000 gross tons of shipping, have become Parties to the 
Convention”. For that reason, on 17 March, 1958, the acceptance of the IMO Convention 
by Egypt and Japan brought the number of Parties to 21, and the Convention finally 
entered into force. 
 
The text of the Convention, as it was explained suffered many amendments, until it 
reached the current status. To become party of the IMO, a State shall be first member of 
the United Nations and after that it should ratify the IMO Convention. Currently, as it was 




Appendix D - Beginning of the Port State Control MOU´s 
As every important measure undertaken by the whole shipping community, the 
establishment of the MOU´s was not the exception, as it appearance was due to a very 
important ship casualty. The history began in Europe, especially since March 1978, due 
to the Liberian-flagged oil tanker “Amoco Cadiz” that ran aground off the coast of 
Brittany/France, breaking into three parts.  As a result of this, more than 220.000 tons of 
crude oil spilled out into the sea causing an incredible environmental impact where 
thousands of seabirds perished. According the investigation, the accident was caused by a 
breakdown of the tanker’s steering gear, insufficient monitoring of the ship’s technical 
condition, inadequate training of the crew and deficiencies in the safety management on 
board. 
 
The impact of this incident was huge, pictures of stricken seabirds and polluted beaches 
were seen all over the world and provoked discussions on the causes of the accident. 
Therefore, that was the beginning of port state control.  
 
Just few days after the casualty, 14 European states agreed to join forces against unsafe 
ships, poorly trained crews and irresponsible ship owners. Since then (1982), the “Paris 
Memorandum of Understanding” (Paris MOU) on port state control has provided the basis 
to perform unannounced surveys of foreign-flagged merchant ships calling at ports of the 
member States of it (Deutsche Flag - Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital 
Infraestructure, 2019). 
 
The Port state controls soon proved effective, in due course, the number of ships with 
numerous deficiencies declined, mainly because the permanent threat of possible surveys 
induced ship owners to take better care of their ships. The rapid and obvious success in 
Europe lead the IMO to assist other regions and member State to conform the same kind 
of agreements, dealing in the current situation explained. 
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Appendix E – List of Member States of every Memorandum of Understanding on 
Port State Control (MOU´s) 
 
Abuja MOU 
Members: Benin, Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea Cote d’Ivoire, Angola, Liberia, Nigeria, 
Senegal Sierra Leone, South Africa, The Gambia, Togo and Sao Tome and Principe 
Signatories: Benin, Cape Verde, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, 
Mauritania, Namibia, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, The Gambia, 
and Togo. 
Black Sea 
Members: Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. 
Caribbean MOU 
Members: Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, The Cayman 
Islands, Cuba, Curaçao, France, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, The Netherlands, St. 
Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and 
Tobago. 
Associated Member: St Kitts & Nevis. 
Observers: Anguilla, Bermuda, The British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Haiti, Sint Maarten, 
Turks and Caicos Islands. 
Indian MOU 
Members: Australia, Bangladesh, Comoros, Eritrea, France (La Reunion), India, Iran, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Myanmar, Oman, Seychelles, Sri 
Lanka, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania and Yemen. 
Observer: Ethiopia 
Mediterranean MOU 





Members: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
Riyadh MOU 
Members: Kingdom of Bahrain, State of Kuwait, Sultanate of Oman, State of Qatar, The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. 
Tokyo MOU 
Members: Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Fiji, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Japan, 
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, New Zealand, Papua 
New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Vanuatu 
and Viet Nam. 
Observers: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Macao (China), Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, Tonga, United States Coast Guard. 
US MOU 
United States Coast Guard 
Viña del Mar Agreement 
Members: Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay 
and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). 




Appendix F: Implementation of Audit Scheme by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO)  
The first international organization to adopt this concept was the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) by the establishment of the Universal Safety Oversight 
Audit Programme (USOAP) in accordance with the fixed strategic objective "Conduct 
aviation safety oversight audits to identify deficiencies and encourage their resolution by 
States." (A3). The USOPA is currently managed by the ICAO Safety Audit Oversight 
Section. 
 
The mandatory programme was launched in January 1999 in response to widespread 
concerns expressed during the 29th ICAO Assembly in 1992. The concern was apparently 
due to there was detected an apparent inability of some Contracting States to carry out 
their safety oversight functions. 
 
At the beginning the scope of the programme was only related to the personnel involved 
in the aeronautical operations. The objective was to audit them, detect the faults to the 
standards and after a certain period of time verify the corrective measures. In 2004, the 
ICAO decided to extend that scope including also issues related to the accident 
investigations and aerodromes. Finally, in 2005 the organization due to the success of the 
programme decided to incorporate all safety-related measures. Moreover, since 2010, the 
ICAO decided to make a continuous monitoring system, meaning that every Member State 
will be audited in a period of six-years cycle. 
 
With the implementation of this programme, the ICAO established an independent and 
transparent mechanism to “examination of the quality or condition of something”, being 





Appendix G: List of instruments covered by VIMSAS documentation 
 
 the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended 
(SOLAS 1974); 
 the Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea, 1974, as amended (SOLAS PROT 1978); 
 the Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea, 1974, as amended (SOLAS PROT 1988); 
 the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as 
modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, as amended (MARPOL 73/78); 
 the Protocol of 1997 to amend the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto 
(MARPOL PROT 1997); 
 the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended (STCW1978);  
 the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 (LL 66); 
 the Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 
(LL PROT 1988); 
 the International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969 (Tonnage 
1969);  
 the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 




Appendix H: The Audit process 
The instruments established the procedure to conduct the audit where the agreed timeline 
is the most relevant characteristic. Basically, the process begins when the audit is 
programmed, the Secretary General designed an audit team and then a Memorandum of 
Cooperation will be signed between him and a representative person from the Member 
State. At that moment the timeline will be settled and the Member State will start the 
communications with the team leader, providing the pre-audit questionnaire and every 
other documentation that it will be needed. Since that moment, both parts should have at 
least six months to prepare the audit itself, in order to check the information and also for 
the Government to inform every involved institution the scope of the process. 
 
Once in situs, the audit should be conducted in an objective way, complying with the 
strategy and principles settled in the Framework, achieving also achieve the highest 
standards of objectivity, impartiality and confidentiality. 
 
The audit could last around seven days and it should be conducted following what was 
established in the Code for the implementation of mandatory IMO instruments (III Code). 
Every non-conformity, should be discussed with the responsible Member State official 
and recorded as the Procedures indicates.  
 




Appendix I – Dates of entry into force amendments making mandatory the Audit 
Scheme 
 
Table 1 - Date of entry into force amendments making mandatory the Audit Scheme 
IMO Instruments Session of adoption and 
instrument 
Acceptance Entry into 
force 
SOLAS Convention MSC 93 (May 2014) 
Resolution MSC.366 (93) 
01/07/2015 01/01/2016 
MARPOL Convention MEPC 66 (March 2014) 
Resolution MEPC.246 (66) 
Annexes I to V and 
MEPC.247 (66) Annex VI 
01/07/2015 01/01/2016 
Load Line Convention A 28 (December 2013) 









Load Line Protocol MSC 93 (May 2014) 
Resolution MSC.375 (93) 
01/07/2015 01/01/2016 
STCW Convention MSC 93 (May 2014) 
Resolution MSC.373 (93) 
01/07/2015 01/01/2016 
COLREG A 28 (December 2013) 
Resolution A.1085 (28) 
01/07/2015 01/01/2016 
TONNAGE Convention A 28 (December 2013) 













Appendix J: Reports during the Audit Process 
All the results obtained during the audit are placed in the several reports that should be 
produced during the process.  
 
The first one is the interim report, that basically contains the findings and, usually, is 
presented during the closing ceremony. On its basis, the Member State will prepare the 
corrective action plan considering every finding. Once it is finished and submitted to the 
Audit team, they will include them to the interim report giving rise to the Final Audit 
Report (IMO, 2005a). 
 
The Audit team will also prepare an audit summary report, which will as far as practicable 
not identify the audited Member State, but it will provide an overview of that audited 
Member State´s adherence to the Code for the implementation of mandatory IMO 
instruments. Based on them, the Secretariat should prepare a consolidated report on a 
periodic basis containing lessons learned from the audits. 
 
Finally, the Audit Team leader will also prepare a separate report describing the conduct 
of the audit, highlighting the positive elements and difficulties encountered and proposals 
to improve the planning and conduct of audits. 
 
A record of all feedback and recommendations from mission reports of all audit team 
leaders and of action taken to address concerns raised should be maintained by the 




Appendix K – Questionnaires used (English, Spanish and Portuguese) 
 
Questionnaire (English version) 
1- General information 
1.1 Please state your position in your National Maritime Administrations (NMA) 
……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
1.2 Please mention the institutions that compose the National Maritime Administration 
regarding the following obligations: 




 Provide Search 
and Rescue 
service 
















 Install and 
operate VTS 








     
 
1.3 Please describe the resources and provision in your National Maritime Administration 
for developing, documenting and providing guidance concerning requirements of the 
mandatory IMO regulations that are to “the satisfaction of the Administration” (please 
refer III Code paragraph 16.5) 
…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
1.4 Please specify the number of ships flagged under your flag? 
 International cargo ships:   International Passenger Ships: 
 Fishing Vessels:    Domestic Passenger Ships: 
 National Trade:     Others: 
 








Name of the 
Recognized 
Organization 









with the RO 
     
     
     
 
1.6 Please, specify the number of Flag State inspectors in your National Maritime 
Administration and number of inspections over the last 12 years? 









            
 
2- IMO Audit Scheme 
2.1 Is your country an IMO Member State? 
YES NO 
Since when?   
 
2.2 Did your Maritime Administration receive the VIMSAS Audit? 
YES NO 
Year   
 
2.3 Did your Maritime Administration receive the IMSAS Audit? 
YES NO 
Year   
 
2.4 The III Code divides the scope of the audit in four different categories (General 
aspects, Flag States, Coastal State, Port State). Please specify the number of findings your 
Maritime Administration face during the last IMO audit? 
 
Number of Findings 
 General Aspect Flag States Coastal State Port State 
VIMSAS Audit     








3- Port State Control 




3.2 Is your country part of any Port State Control MOU? 
YES NO 




3.3 Please list the number of Port State Control Officers in your National Maritime 
Administration over the last 12 years? 
 










            
 
3.4 Please provide the number of detentions of your flagged ships during the last 12 years 
and the number of the National Maritime Administration intervention on that behalf 
 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of 
detentions 
            
 
Interventio












            
Other             
 
4- Statistics 
4.1 Please list the number of personnel in your National Maritime Administration 
engaged in the implementation of international maritime law over the last 12 years 




            
 
5- Adoption of IMO Instruments 
5.1 In the table below, please provide the date of ratification and the implementation of 











Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea, 1974, as 
amended (SOLAS 1974) 
25th May 
1980 
   
The Protocol of 1988 
relating to the International 
Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea, 1974, as 





   
The International 
Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships, 1973, as 
modified by the Protocol 






   
The Protocol of 1997 to 
amend the International 
Convention for the 
19th May 
2005 
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Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships, as modified by 
the Protocol of 1978 
relating thereto (MARPOL 
PROT 1997) 
The International 
Convention on Standards 
of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers, 1978, as 
amended (STCW 1978) 
28th April 
1984 
   
The International 
Convention on Load Lines, 
1966 (LL 66) 
21st July 
1968 
   
The Protocol of 1988 
relating to the International 
Convention on Load Lines, 




   
The International 
Convention on Tonnage 
Measurement of Ships, 
1969 (Tonnage 1969) 
18th July 
1982 
   
The Convention on the 
International Regulations 
for Preventing Collisions 




   
 
6- Technical Cooperation 
6.1 Technical Cooperation is a key issue for every Member State to be ready to face the 
Audit Scheme. Has your National Maritime Administration approached the IMO for any 
TC activity? 
 
6.2 Is your National Maritime Administration considering to apply for any Technical 
Cooperation activity in the near future to prepare the next audit? 
NO YES 
 Kind of activity Date Outcome 
    
    
    
NO YES 




6.3 Has your National Maritime Administration engaged in bilateral or multilateral 
cooperation to prepare itself to receive IMO Audit? 
Thank you very much for you kindly cooperation! 
 
Cuestionario (Spanish version) 
1-Información general 
1.1 Cargo que ocupa en su Administración Marítima Nacional. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
1.2 Mencione las instituciones que componen la Administración Marítima Nacional 










 Servicio de 
búsqueda y 
rescate 






































     
 
   
   
NO YES 
 Kind of 
activity 
Date Outcome Which other country 
and Institution 
participate 
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1.3 Describa los recursos y las disposiciones de su Administración Marítima Nacional 
para desarrollar, documentar y brindar asesoramiento respecto de la reglamentación 
obligatoria de la OMI que se deja «a criterio de la Administración» (haga referencia al 
párrafo 16.5 del Código para la implantación de los instrumentos de la OMI (Código III)). 
…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
1.4 Especifique la cantidad de buques que enarbolan su bandera. 
 Buques de carga internacional:    
 Buques de pasaje que realizan travesías internacionales: 
 Buques pesqueros:     
 Buques de pasaje que realizan travesías nacionales: 
 Comercio nacional:      
 Otros: 
 
1.5 ¿Su organización marítima nacional delega alguna de sus funciones a las 
Organizaciones Reconocidas?  
SI NO 
 
Si su respuesta fue afirmativa, por favor brinde los siguientes datos: 
 















     
     
     
 
1.6 Especifique la cantidad de inspectores del Estado de abanderamiento de su 
Administración Marítima Nacional y la cantidad de inspecciones realizadas durante los 
últimos 12 años. 






            
Cantidad de 
inspecciones 
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del Estado de 
abanderamiento 
 
2-Plan de auditorías de la OMI 
2.1 ¿Su país es un Estado Miembro de la OMI? 
SI NO 
¿Desde cuándo?   
 
2.2 ¿Se realizaron auditorías del VIMSAS [Plan Voluntario de Auditorías de los Estados 
Miembros de la OMI] en su Administración Marítima? 
SI NO 
Año   
 
2.3 ¿Se realizaron auditorías del IMSAS [Plan de Auditorías de los Estados Miembros 
de la OMI] en su Administración Marítima? 
SI NO 
Año   
 
2.4 El Código III divide el alcance de la auditoría en cuatro categorías diferentes (Aspectos 
generales, Estados de abanderamiento, Estado ribereño y Estado rector). Especifique la 
cantidad de resultados que obtuvo su Administración Marítima durante la última auditoría 
de la OMI. 
 





Estado ribereño Estado rector 
Auditorías del 
VIMSAS 
    
Auditorías del 
IMSAS 
    
 
2.5 ¿Se encuentra disponible el informe final del VIMSAS o del IMSAS realizado en su 




3- Estado rector del puerto 






3.2 ¿Su país es parte de algún MOU [Memorando de Entendimiento] sobre supervisión 






3.3 Enumere la cantidad de Oficiales responsables de la supervisión por el Estado rector 
del puerto de su Administración Marítima Nacional registrada durante los últimos 12 años. 
 










            
Cantidad de 
inspecciones 







            
 
3.4 Especifique la cantidad de detenciones de los buques que han enarbolado su bandera 
durante los últimos 12 años y la cantidad de intervenciones que ha realizado su 
Administración Marítima Nacional a tal efecto. 
 
Año 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Cantidad de 
detenciones 
            
 
Intervencion





















            
Otros             
 
4- Estadísticas 
4.1 Enumere la cantidad de personal de su Administración Marítima Nacional 
involucrado con la implementación del derecho marítimo internacional durante los 
últimos 12 años. 




            
 
5-Adopción de los instrumentos de la OMI 
5.1 En el cuadro que aparece a continuación, brinde por favor la fecha de ratificación e 











Convenio internacional para 
la seguridad de la vida 
humana en el mar,  1974, en 
su forma enmendada 




   
Protocolo de 1988 relativo al 
Convenio internacional para 
la seguridad de la vida 
humana en el mar de 1974 
(Protocolo del 




   
Convenio internacional para 
prevenir la contaminación 
por los buques, 1973, 
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de 1978, en su forma 
enmendada 
(Convenio MARPOL 73/78) 
Protocolo de 1997 que 
enmienda el Convenio 
internacional para prevenir 
la contaminación 
proveniente de los buques, 
modificado por el Protocolo 






   
Convenio internacional 
sobre normas de formación, 
titulación y guardia para el 
personal de los buques 
pesqueros, 1978, en su forma 
enmendada 




   
Convenio internacional 
sobre líneas de carga, 1966 




   
Protocolo de 1988 relativo al 
Convenio internacional 
sobre líneas de carga, 1966 
(Protocolo de Líneas de 




   
Convenio internacional 
sobre arqueo de 
buques, 1969 (Convenio de 




   
Convenio sobre el 
Reglamento internacional 
para prevenir los 
abordajes, 1972, en su forma 
enmendada 




   
 
6-Cooperación Técnica 
6.1 La Cooperación Técnica constituye un tema fundamental a los fines de que cada 
Estado Miembro se prepare para recibir un Plan de auditorías. ¿Su Administración 






6.2 ¿Su Administración Marítima Nacional está considerando solicitar alguna actividad 
de cooperación técnica en un futuro cercano para preparar la próxima auditoría? 
 
6.3 ¿Ha participado su Administración Marítima Nacional en actividades de cooperación 
bilateral o multilateral a los fines de prepararse para recibir Auditorías de la OMI? 
 
¡Muchas gracias por su amable colaboración! 
 
Questionário (Portuguese version) 
1-Informação Geral 
1.1 Cargo que ocupa na Administração Marítima Nacional. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
1.2 Mencione as instituições que compõem a Administração Marítima Nacional, levando 











 Serviço de 
Busca e 
Salvamento 















de navios pelo 
 
 Tipo de actividad Fecha Resultados 
    
    
    
NO SI 
 Tipo de actividad Fecha planificada 
   
   
NO SI 
 Tipo de 
actividad 
Fecha Resultados ¿Qué otro país y qué 
institución 
participan? 
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com a IMO 
     
 
1.3 Descreva os recursos e as disposições de sua Administração Marítima Nacional para 
o desenvolvimento, a documentação e as orientações sobre a regulamentação obrigatória 
da IMO que fica “ao critério da Administração” (faça referência ao parágrafo 16.5 do 
Código para a aplicação dos instrumentos IMO (Código III)). 
…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
1.4 Especifique o número de navios que arvoram sua bandeira. 
 Navios de carga internacional:    
 Navios de passageiros que realizam travessias internacionais: 
 Navios pesqueiros: 
 Navios de passageiros que realizam travessias nacionais: 
 Navios de comércio nacional: 
  Outros: 
 









Data do acordo Funções 
delegadas 











     
     
     
 
1.6 Especifique o número de inspetores do Estado de Bandeira de sua Administração 
Marítima Nacional e o número de inspeções realizadas nos últimos 12 anos. 














            
 
2-Plano de auditorias da IMO 
2.1 Seu país é um Estado Membro da IMO? 
SIM NÃO 
Desde quando?   
 
2.2 Foram realizadas auditorias do VIMSAS [Plano Voluntário de Auditorias dos 
Estados Membros da IMO] em sua Administração Marítima? 
SIM NÃO 
Ano   
 
2.3 Foram realizadas auditorias do IMSAS [Plano de Auditorias dos Estados Membros 
da IMO] em sua Administração Marítima? 
SIM NÃO 
Ano   
 
2.4 O Código III divide o escopo da auditoria em quatro categorias diferentes (Aspectos 
gerais, Estados de bandeira, Estado ribeirinho e Estado reitor do porto). Especifique o 
número de resultados que obteve sua Administração Marítima durante a última auditoria 
da IMO. 
 
Número de resultados 
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Auditorias do 
IMSAS 
    
 
2.5 Está disponível o relatório final do VIMSAS ou do IMSAS realizado em seu pais? É 




3-Estado reitor do porto 




3.2 Seu país é membro de algum MoU [Memorando de Entendimento] sobre supervisão 






3.3 Determine o número de Oficiais responsáveis pela supervisão de navios pelo Estado 
reitor do porto de sua Administração Marítima Nacional registrado nos últimos 12 anos. 
 
























3.4 Especifique o número de detenções de navios que arvoram sua bandeira produzidas 
nos últimos 12 anos e o número de intervenções de sua Administração Marítima Nacional 
a respeito desse assunto. 
 
Ano 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Número de 
detençoes 




















            
Outros             
 
4-Estatísticas 
4.1 Determine o número de pessoas em sua Administração Marítima Nacional 
envolvidas na aplicação do Direito Marítimo Internacional nos últimos 12 anos. 




            
 
5-Adoção de Instrumentos IMO 
5.1 Na tabela a seguir, por favor, indique a data de ratificação e de aplicação dos 













para a Salvaguarda da Vida 
Humana no Mar, 1974, em 
sua forma emendada 




   
O Protocolo de 1988 sobre 
a Convenção Internacional 
para a Salvaguarda da Vida 
Humana no Mar de 1974 
(Protocolo da Convenção 




   
A Convenção Internacional 
para a Prevenção da 
Poluição por Navios, 1973, 
modificada pelo Protocolo 






   
O Protocolo de 1997 que 
emenda a Convenção 
Internacional para a 
Prevenção da Poluição por 
Navios, modificado pelo 
Protocolo de 1978 





   
A Convenção Internacional 
sobre Padrões de Instrução, 
Certificação e Serviço de 
Quarto para Marítimos, 
1978, em sua forma 
emendada (Convenção 
STCW 1978) 
28 de abril 
de 1984 
   
Convenção Internacional 
sobre Linhas de Carga, 




   
O Protocolo de 1988 sobre 
a Convenção Internacional 
sobre Linhas de Carga, 
1966 (Protocolo de Linhas 




   
Convenção Internacional 




   
115 
 
Navios, 1969 (Convenção 
de Arqueação de 1969) 
Convenção sobre o 
Regulamento Internacional 
para evitar Abalroamentos 







   
 
6-Cooperação Técnica 
6.1 A Cooperação Técnica é um assunto importante para cada Estado Membro que 
procure se preparar para o Plano de Auditorias. Sua Administração Marítima Nacional 
entrou em contato com a IMO para realizar alguma atividade de Cooperação Técnica? 
 
6.2 Sua Administração Marítima Nacional está considerando a realização de alguma 
atividade de Cooperação Técnica com o objetivo de se preparar para as próximas 
Auditorias da IMO? 
 
6.3 Sua Administração Marítima Nacional participou alguma vez de atividades de 
cooperação bilateral ou multilateral com o objetivo de se preparar para as próximas 
Auditorias da IMO? 
 
Agradecemos muito sua gentil cooperação! 
  
NÃO SIM 
 Tipo de atividade Data Resultado 
    
    
    
NÃO SIM 
 Tipo de atividade Data programada 
   
   
NÃO SIM 
 Tipo de 
atividade 
Data Resultados Outro pais ou 
instituição 
participante 
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Appendix L – Analysis of Annual Reports conducted MOU by MOU 
 
Abuja MOU 
An analysis of information provided by The Memorandum of Understanding on Port State 
Control for West and Central African Region (Abuja MOU) will be conducted in this 
section. It will be done through the “Annual Reports” of the years contained in the period 
established (2006 – 2017). However, in this occasion the analysis is conducted since 2010 
as the previous Annual Reports are not available in the website of the MOU 
(Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control for West & Central African 
Region, 2019). 
Table 2 - General Information 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
N° 
Inspections 





173 129 108 173 179 143 153 174 
N° 
Detentions 















































Table 3 - Information related ships flagged with a Viña del Mar Agreement´s Flag 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
N° Inspections 333 244 224 470 338 289 262 311 
N° inspections 
with deficiencies 
46 29 16 24 27 24 40 31 




The two tables above have been made by using the information provided in the Annual 
Reports mentioned. The following step, in order to obtain the indicator 1 to 4, is to 
determine the Abuja MOU detention rate per year, and then analyze the information 
related the ships flagged Viña del Mar Agreement´s Flags. 
Table 4 - Yearly Detention Rate 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Detention Rate 0.76 0.74 0.38 0.37 0.48 0.38 1.25 0.77 
 
Table 5 - Yearly Deficiencies Rate 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Deficiencies 
Rate 
8.8 8.7 5.2 5.38 6.13 6.09 7.96 8.38 
 
Table 6 - Behavior of Viña del Mar´s Fleet in Abuja MOU 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Deficiencies 
Rate 
13.81 11.88 7.14 5.1 7.99 8.3 15.26 9.97 
Detention Rate 3 0.41 0.44 0.85 0.89 0.35 1.9 0.96 
 














Figure Appendices 3 - Yearly Deficiencies Rate 
 




























In the Abuja MOU it was seen that the detention rate in general was experiencing a 
decrease since 2010 until 2013, where there was a slight increment, followed but another 
one in 2014. However, in 2015 another decrease happened, but it was followed but an 
important increment in 2016. This figure was followed by a decrement in 2017 reaching 
almost the same point reached in 2010. 
 
Regarding the deficiencies rate, since 2010 till 2012 there was a decrement of it, but since 
that year the rate showed a yearly increment until 2017 where it almost reached the same 
level shown in 2010. 
The ships flagged with flag of the Viña del Mar Agreement showed a similar trend in 
deficiencies to the general rate, but the final figure, in 2017, finished in a lower level than 
the one showed in 2010, however, is higher than the one 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015. The 
detention rate showed a decrement from the first figure in 2010, showing another peak in 
2016, but ending in 2017 showing an important decrement.  
 
The causes of the deficiencies, were first analyzed in the Annual Report of 2012, showing 
that the main reason of deficiencies were problems related with the certificates and 
documents (24,22%), followed by lack of compliance with SOLAS regulations related to 
the safety of navigation (9,9%). From 2013 to 2017 the category of “Other” was the one 
that showed the biggest amount of deficiencies (25,3%, 39,9%, 41,67%, 30,06% and 
27,94% respectively). However, in every year, except in 2017, the second category 
observed were problems with certificates and documentation. In 2017, the second place 
was again lack of compliance with SOLAS regulations related to the safety of navigation 
(14,48%). 
Black Sea MOU 
From now on, an analysis on the information provided by The Black Sea Memorandum 
of Understanding on Port State Control (Black Sea MOU) will be conducted. It will be 
120 
 
done through the “Annual Reports” of the period considered, available in the official 
website (Black Sea MOU, 2019). 
Table 7 - General Information 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
N° Inspections 4260 4499 5161 4805 4929 4657 
N° inspections 
with deficiencies 
3232 3258 3504 3216 3191 3156 
N° Detentions 259 367 329 278 286 249 
Main area of 
deficiencies 











































Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
N° Inspections 4607 5080 5092 4997 5066 5112 
N° inspections 
with deficiencies 
3002 3306 3051 2825 2845 3018 
N° Detentions 215 184 151 218 229 283 








































Table 8 - Information related ships flagged with a Viña del Mar Agreement´s Flag 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
N° Inspections 462 530 680 565 618 484 
N° inspections with 
deficiencies 
350 414 487 426 439 339 
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N° Detentions 28 52 71 52 46 27 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
N° Inspections 498 608 629 668 700 760 
N° inspections with 
deficiencies 
327 392 380 395 425 472 
N° Detentions 25 24 22 23 34 58 
 
Table 9 - Yearly Detention Rate 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Detention Rate 6.08 8.15 6.37 5.78 5.8 5.34 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Detention Rate 4.66 3.62 2.97 4.36 4.52 5.53 
 
Table 10 - Yearly Deficiencies Rate 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Deficiencies  Rate 75.86 72.42 67.9 66.93 64.74 67.76 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Deficiencies Rate 65.16 65.07 59.9 56.53 56.16 59.03 
 
Table 11 - Behavior of Viña del Mar´s Fleet in Black Sea MOU 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Deficiencies Rate 75.75 78.11 71.61 75.4 71.03 70.04 
Detention Rate 6.06 9.8 10.44 9.2 7.44 5.57 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Deficiencies Rate 65.66 64.47 60.41 59.13 60.71 62.1 




Figure Appendices 5 - Yearly Detention Rate 
 


























Figure Appendices 7 - Behavior of Viña del Mar´s Fleet in Black Sea MOU 
In the Black Sea MOU it was seen that the detention rate in general was experiencing a 
decrease. The peak was reached in 2007 and since that year it has been reduced 
significantly until reaching the minimum rate in 2014. Since that year there have been a 
slight increment. 
 
The deficiencies rate started in 2006 with its maximum peak, since that moment it 
experienced a yearly decrement until 2016. During 2017, there was a slight increment. 
The fleet flagged with Viña del Mar Agreement´s flags showed the same behavior as the 
detention rate as well as the deficiencies one demonstrated a decrement. However, during 
the last two years analyzed showed a slight increment. 
 
Finally, regarding the main category on the deficiencies found for the Members of the 
MOU, it can be seen that there have been 6 main areas, where issues related with the 
structure, stability and equipment have been the one who was the main one in five different 
years. In other three years, the deficiencies related with the certificates and documentation 















different, in two of them issues related with the safety of navigation, one time the category 
with load line problem and the last one with problems in the fire safety system. 
Caribbean MOU 
In this section an analysis of information provided by The Caribbean Memorandum of 
Understanding on Port State Control (Caribbean MOU) will be conducted. It will be done 
through the “Annual Reports” of the years contained in the period established (2006 – 
2017). However, in this occasion the analysis is conducted since 2008 as the previous 
Annual Reports are not available in the website of the MOU (Caribbean Memorandum of 
Understanding on Port State Control (Caribbean MOU), 2019). The MOU established as 
its mission “Eliminate the Operation of Substandard Ships in the Region through a 
harmonized system of Port State Control.” 
Table 12 - General Information 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 





436 181 289 
N° Detentions 8 23 12 20 19 







































Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
N° Inspections 994 836 867 859 769 
N° inspections 
with deficiencies 
336 373 392 346 301 
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N° Detentions 18 15 18 15 10 

































Table 13 - Information related ships flagged with a Viña del Mar Agreement´s Flag 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
N° Inspections 142 Not available 165 134 123 
N° inspections with 
deficiencies 
Not available Not available 140 41 57 
N° Detentions 3 Not available 6 11 5 
 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
N° Inspections 197 145 150 141 145 
N° inspections with 
deficiencies 
66 79 85 63 68 
N° Detentions 5 4 4 3 1 
 
Table 14 - Yearly Detention Rate 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Detention Rate 1.33 3.71 1.47 3.25 2.94 
 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Detention Rate 1.81 1.79 2.07 1.74 1.3 
 
Table 15 - Yearly Deficiencies Rate 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 




Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Deficiencies Rate 33.8 44.6 45.21 40.27 39.14 
 
Table 16 - Behavior of Viña del Mar´s Fleet in Caribbean MOU 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Deficiencies Rate Not available Not available 84.84 30.6 46.34 
Detention Rate 2.11 Not available 3.63 8.2 4.06 
 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Deficiencies Rate 33.5 54.48 56.66 44.68 46.89 
Detention Rate 2.53 2.75 2.66 2.12 0.69 
 















Figure Appendices 9 - Yearly Deficiencies Rate 
 
Figure Appendices 10 - Behavior of Viña del Mar´s Fleet in Caribbean MOU 
With the information provided by the Caribbean MOU, firstly it should be mentioned that 
it starts in 2008, because the previous reports are not available. Therefore, it can be seen 























since that year the average rate was decreasing yearly, reaching the minimum value in 
2017. 
 
Regarding the deficiencies rate, it must be considered that the value of 2009 in not 
available. Anyway, the analysis was made with the other years and as it can be seen in 
Figure 40 the value was fluctuating yearly after reaching its peak in 2010. Since 2014 it 
adopted a value almost constant for the following years. 
 
For the Viña del Mar Agreement flagged ships the information could be considered 
directly since 2010. That year was the peak of the deficiencies rate, that decreased in the 
following year to keep an almost constant value for the rest of the period. The detention 
rate had its peak in 2011 and after that it showed a constantly decrease, reaching the 
minimum value in 2017. 
 
Finally, over the ten years analyzed, the category that showed the biggest amount of 
deficiencies in seven of them was the problem with “fire safety system”. Especially in the 
last seven years this was considered as the most relevant problem in foreign ships that call 
in ports of the Caribbean MOU´s Members. 
Indian Ocean MOU 
From now on, an analysis on the information provided by The Indian Ocean Memorandum 
of Understanding on Port State Control (Indian Ocean MOU) will be conducted. It will be 
done through the “Annual Reports” of the period considered, available in the official 
website, where it also can be read the following statement: “our ultimate goal is to identify 
and eliminate substandard ships from the region” (The Indian Ocean Memorandum of 
Understanding on Port State Control (Indian Ocean MOU) , 2019). 
Table 17 - General information 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 





2836 2630 3067 3116 2869 3306 
N° Detentions 406 453 553 517 471 600 
Main area of 
deficiencies 
SOLAS-Fire 
Safety 14,8%  




































Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
N° Inspections 5051 5320 6059 6253 6010 5674 
N° inspections 
with deficiencies 
2800 2961 3469 3374 3393 3017 
N° Detentions 433 376 379 350 370 281 
Main area of 
deficiencies 






































Table 18 - Information related ships flagged with a Viña del Mar Agreement´s Flag 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
N° Inspections 1502 1497 1725 1595 1563 1480 
N° inspections with 
deficiencies 
880 865 991 956 834 892 
N° Detentions 141 155 196 160 139 171 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
N° Inspections 1355 1356 1495 1568 1528 1311 
N° inspections with 
deficiencies 
780 791 932 927 957 804 




Table 19 - Yearly Detention Rate 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Detention Rate 7.92 9.41 9.82 9.6 8.54 10.81 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Detention Rate 8.57 7.06 6.25 5.59 6.15 4.95 
 
Table 20 - Yearly Deficiencies Rate 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Deficiencies  Rate 55.35 54.67 54.46 57.88 52.04 59.56 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Deficiencies Rate 55.43 55.65 57.25 53.95 56.45 53.17 
 
Table 21 - Behavior of Viña del Mar´s Fleet in Indian Ocean MOU 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Deficiencies Rate 58.58 57.78 57.45 59.93 53.34 60.27 
Detention Rate 9.38 10.35 11.36 10.03 8.89 11.55 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Deficiencies Rate 57.56 58.33 62.34 59.12 62.63 61.32 






































2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017




Figure Appendices 13 - Behavior of Viña del Mar´s Fleet in Indian Ocean MOU 
The information taken from the Annual Reports for the established period indicated that 
the detention rate in the Indian Ocean MOU showed a constant decrement, reaching the 
minimum value in 2017. 
 
The rate of the inspections with deficiencies was very variable along the period, however, 
since reaching the peak in 2011, the values have been decreasing during the following 
years, reaching the second minimum level in 2017. 
 
Considering the reasons of the deficiencies detected during the control in the Members of 
the Indian Ocean MOU, it was clear during the twelve years that there were two main 
reason of them, “fire safety system failure” and “problem with the safety of navigations 
equipment”. If both categories are added, every year they were detected as the reasons of 
the 30% of the deficiencies on board foreign ships in the regions. 
 
Finally, analyzing the situation of the ships flagged with any Viña del Mar Agreement´s 













increment in the last year, however, the level have been almost constant along the period. 
On the detention rate it can be seen that there was a notable decrement on the rate since 
the beginning of the period until 2017.  
Mediterranean MOU 
In this section there will be conducted an analysis on the information provided by The 
Mediterranean Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Mediterranean 
MOU). It will be done through the “Annual Reports” of the period considered, available 
in the official website (The Mediterranean Memorandum of Understanding on Port State 
Control (Mediterranean MOU), 2019). 
Table 22 - General Information 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
N° Inspections 4582 5868 6317 6966 6783 6225 
N° inspections 
with deficiencies 
3231 3789 3772 4110 4053 3624 
N° Detentions 791 921 629 707 527 412 
Main area of 
deficiencies 












































Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
N° Inspections 5645 4698 5049 5740 5312 5200 
N° inspections 
with deficiencies 
3146 2550 2591 2862 2741 2697 
N° Detentions 416 262 298 300 228 173 


















































Table 23 - Information related ships flagged with a Viña del Mar Agreement´s Flag 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
N° Inspections 633 834 966 997 971 869 
N° inspections with 
deficiencies 
450 553 622 612 577 508 
N° Detentions 137 152 124 132 80 65 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
N° Inspections 797 667 764 821 816 819 
N° inspections with 
deficiencies 
428 342 421 424 446 448 
N° Detentions 50 37 47 42 42 25 
 
Table 24 - Yearly Detention Rate 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Detention Rate 17.26 15.69 9.95 10.14 7.77 6.62 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Detention Rate 7.37 5.57 5.9 5.22 4.29 3.32 
 
Table 25 - Yearly Deficiencies Rate 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Deficiencies  Rate 70.51 64.57 59.71 59.00 59.75 58.22 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 




Table 26 - Behavior of Viña del Mar´s Fleet in Mediterranean MOU 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Deficiencies Rate 71.09 66.3 64.39 61.38 59.42 58.46 
Detention Rate 21.64 18.22 12.84 13.24 8.24 7.48 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Deficiencies Rate 53.7 51.27 55.1 51.64 54.65 54.7 
Detention Rate 6.27 5.55 6.15 5.11 5.14 3.05 
 
















Figure Appendices 15 - Yearly Deficiencies Rate 
 
 
Figure Appendices 16 - Behavior of Viña del Mar´s Fleet in Mediterranean MOU 
The analysis of the Annual Report from the Mediterranean MOU seems to be one of the 
most hopeful one if we consider the aim of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
for the MOU´s. The reason is because both, the detention rate and the deficiencies detected 
























the last year of it 2017. Both reached the minimum value in 2017 and the decrement was 
almost constant every year. However, it is important to highlight that the amount of ships 
inspected was constant too. 
 
Regarding the common causes of the deficiencies, issues related to the safety of navigation 
was the main one in almost every year. Another issues showed an increasing relevance 
such as problem with the certification and documents, especially in last 3 years of the 
period. 
 
The fleet flagged with flags of the Members of the Viña del Mar Agreement showed a 
similar behavior as the general rates. The deficiencies rate experienced a slight increment 
in 2014 and in 2016, however, the detention rate was decreasing every year of the period 
analyzed. 
Paris MOU 
In this section there will be conducted an analysis on the information provided by The 
Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris MOU). It will be done 
through the “Annual Reports” of the period considered, available in the official website 
(The Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris MOU), 2019). 
Table 27 - General Information 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
N° Inspections 21566 22877 24647 24186 24058 19058 
N° inspections 
with deficiencies 
11549 12896 14322 13844 13282 10731 
N° Detentions 1174 1250 1220 1059 790 688 
Main area of 
deficiencies 
SOLAS-Fire 
Safety 12,87% - 































Safety 12,89% - 






Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
N° Inspections 18308 17687 18430 17858 17840 17916 
N° inspections 
with deficiencies 
10460 10331 10214 9381 9288 9287 
N° Detentions 669 668 612 595 683 685 
Main area of 
deficiencies 
SOLAS-Fire 




































Table 28 - Information related ships flagged with a Viña del Mar Agreement´s Flag 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
N° Inspections 2510 2661 3035 2785 2705 2244 
N° inspections with 
deficiencies 
1463 1642 1874 1708 1529 1232 
N° Detentions 223 243 234 167 93 107 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
N° Inspections 2031 2034 2085 2029 2014 2119 
N° inspections with 
deficiencies 
1191 1244 1243 1186 1150 1194 
N° Detentions 98 115 109 95 115 130 
 
Table 29 - Yearly Detention Rate 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Detention Rate 5.44 5.46 4.95 4.37 3.28 3.61 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 




Table 30 - Yearly Deficiencies Rate 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Deficiencies  Rate 53.55 56.37 58.11 57.24 55.20 56.3 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Deficiencies Rate 57.13 58.41 55.42 52.53 56.06 51.84 
 
Table 31 - Behavior of Viña del Mar´s Fleet in Paris MOU 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Deficiencies Rate 58.28 61.70 61.74 61.32 56.52 54.9 
Detention Rate 8.88 9.13 7.71 5.99 3.44 4.76 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Deficiencies Rate 58.64 61.16 59.61 58.45 57.1 56.35 
Detention Rate 4.82 5.65 5.23 4.68 5.71 6.13 
 












Figure Appendices 18 - Yearly Deficiencies Rate 
 
 
Figure Appendices 19 - Behavior of Viña del Mar´s Fleet in Paris MOU 
Analyzing the Annual Reports provided from the Paris MOU it can be seen that the 
detention rate one big decrement since the period started, until it reached the minimum 





















100 ships between 4 and 3 have been detained considered a high risk for the navigation, 
according it was established by the IMO and explained in Chapter 3. 
 
The amount of deficient ships while the inspections are taken place showed a highly 
variable rate. It showed two high peak, in 2008 and 2013. However, the minimum level 
has been reached in the last year analyzed that can be considered as a compliance with the 
IMO aim. 
 
Regarding the most common deficiencies found during the inspections, can be clearly 
stated that along the period there was a tie between problem with the fire safety system 
and the navigation one, because those causes have been observed in 6 years each as the 
most common one. 
 
Finally, analyzing the behavior of the fleet flying flags from the Viña del Mar Agreement´s 
Member, it can be seen along the period that both rates have been mostly stable. The 
deficiencies rate was in a high level, over the 60 points during the years 2007, 2008 and 
2009. After that period, it started to decrease reaching it minimum in 2011. And since that 
moment, with the exception of 2013, it kept the level below 60. It is good to remember 
that the 60 points indicate that there is a possibility of 60% that a ship flagged with those 
flags could have a deficiency.  
 
On the other hand, the detention rate of those flags started the period in a high level, but 
after 2007 it gradually started to decrease, having the minimum level in 2010. 
Riyadh MOU 
In this section there will be conducted an analysis on the information provided by The 
Riyadh Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Riyadh MOU). It will be 
done through the “Annual Reports” of the period considered, available in the official 
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website. Unfortunately, the reports are only available from 2012 (The Riyadh 
Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Riyadh MOU), 2019). 
Table 32 - General Information 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
N° Inspections 3357 3508 3859 4165 3381 3104 
N° inspections 
with deficiencies 
626 816 821 953 742 693 
N° Detentions 18 33 44 32 26 38 













































Table 33 - Information related ships flagged with a Viña del Mar Agreement´s Flag 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
N° Inspections 762 757 875 926 740 698 
N° inspections with 
deficiencies 
139 191 213 239 177 184 
N° Detentions 6 7 14 9 11 10 
 
Table 34 - Yearly Detention Rate 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Detention Rate 0.53 0.94 1.14 0.77 0.77 1.22 
 
Table 35 - Yearly Deficiencies Rate 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 




Table 36 - Behavior of Viña del Mar´s Fleet in Riyadh MOU 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Deficiencies Rate 18.24 25.23 24.34 25.8 23.92 26.36 
Detention Rate 0.78 0.92 1.6 0.97 1.49 1.43 
 














Figure Appendices 21 - Yearly Deficiencies Rate 
 
Figure Appendices 22 - Behavior of Viña del Mar´s Fleet in Riyadh MOU 
Unfortunately, the analysis will not be complete as the information for the whole period 
is not available. Therefore, it will start in 2012. Since that year the detention rate of the 



















decreased the following year and remained constant in 2016. However, in 2017 the rate 
reached surprisingly the maximum peak. 
 
On the other side, the deficiencies rate increased from 2012 to 2013, but from that year on 
it remained almost constant in values near 23. That means that every ship that call in some 
of the port of the region has a 25% of chances to have a deficiency. 
 
Regarding the most common causes of deficiencies on board, issues related to the 
certification and documentation have been present in 5 over 6 years analyzed. Another 
important amount of causes has been related to issues related to the safety of navigation.  
Finally, analyzing the behavior of the ships flagged with any flag from the Viña del Mar 
Agreement Members, it can be seen that the deficiencies rate has experimented a constant 
slight increment year by year, at the same level at the general rate for the MOU. The 
detention also showed a slight increment, but always close to 1.4. 
Tokyo MOU 
In this section there will be conducted an analysis on the information provided by The 
Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in the Asian – Pacific Region 
(Tokyo MOU). It will be done through the “Annual Reports” of the period considered, 
available in the official website (The Memorandum of Understanding on Port State 
Control in the Asian – Pacific Region (Tokyo MOU), 2019). 
Table 37 - General Information 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
N° Inspections 21686 22039 22152 23116 25762 28627 
N° inspections 
with deficiencies 
14916 14864 15298 15422 16575 18650 
N° Detentions 1171 1239 1528 1336 1411 1562 
Main area of 
deficiencies 
SOLAS-Fire 
Safety 16,33% - 


















Safety 17,49% - 



















Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
N° Inspections 30929 31018 30405 31407 31678 31315 
N° inspections 
with deficiencies 
19250 18790 19029 19142 18943 18113 
N° Detentions 1421 1395 1203 1153 1090 941 
Main area of 
deficiencies 
SOLAS-Fire 































Safety 18,01% - 




Table 38 - Information related ships flagged with a Viña del Mar Agreement´s Flag 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
N° Inspections 6622 6957 7172 7351 7969 8705 
N° inspections with 
deficiencies 
4312 4458 4732 4748 5092 5583 
N° Detentions 306 336 462 387 420 434 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
N° Inspections 9218 8950 8616 8563 8535 8287 
N° inspections with 
deficiencies 
5674 5337 5430 5147 5103 4826 
N° Detentions 420 401 346 289 294 275 
 
Table 39 - Yearly Detention Rate 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Detention Rate 5.4 5.62 6.9 5.78 5.48 5.46 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
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Detention Rate 4.59 4.5 3.96 3.67 3.44 3.00 
 
Table 40 - Yearly Deficiencies Rate 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Deficiencies  Rate 68.78 67.44 69.06 66.72 64.34 65.15 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Deficiencies Rate 62.24 60.58 62.58 60.95 59.8 57.84 
Table 41 - Behavior of Viña del Mar´s Fleet in Tokyo MOU 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Deficiencies Rate 65.12 64.08 65.98 64.59 63.9 64.14 
Detention Rate 4.62 4.83 6.44 5.26 5.27 4.98 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Deficiencies Rate 61.55 59.63 63.00 60.1 59.79 58.24 
Detention Rate 4.55 4.48 4.01 3.37 3.44 3.32 
 















Figure Appendices 24 - Yearly Deficiencies Rate 
 
Figure Appendices 25 - Behavior of Viña del Mar´s Fleet in Tokyo MOU 
Analyzing the information provided by the Annual Reports of Tokyo MOU about the 
























2008. However, it can be considered the only exception because for the rest of the years 
analyzed it was always resenting a decrement, until reaching the minimum level in 2017. 
The deficiencies rate presented a similar shape to the detention one. But in this case the 
difference is that it also presented an increment in 2011 and 2015 respective the previous 
year. However, in general it can be considered as a decreasing line until it also reached 
the minimum level in 2017. 
 
Talking about the common cause that has been detected as deficiencies in Tokyo MOU 
there have been in every year presented two main categories, the lack of compliance with 
the safety of navigation regulation and the other reason were the problem in the fire safety 
system. 
 
About the ships flagged with Viña del Mar Members flags, it can be seen that the behavior 
of both rates, detention and deficiencies, experimented the same movement along the 
period. They started in a peak or near it, and finished in 2017 in its minimum level. Both 
figures are very important to be highlighted because the number of ships with these flags 
during the whole period was almost constant, which means that the status of the vessels is 
the one that was improving.  
United States MOU 
In the United States, the Port State Control is a function delegated in its Coast Guard. To 
do so, the country decided not to join one of the existing Memorandum of Understanding 
but working as one of them, with the particularity of being composed by only one Member 
States. In this section there will be an analysis of the Annual Reports made by the United 
States MOU for the established period that are available in the official website (The United 
States Coast Guard - Port State Control Division (US MOU), 2019). Unfortunately, the 
reports for 2006, 2007 and 2008 do not provide the information related to the inspections 
with deficiencies neither the category of them. For that reason, some analysis that have 
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been carried in the previous MOU´s was not possible not be done for those years. Since 
2009, the analysis is complete as it was done in the previous MOU´s analysis. 
Table 42 - General Information 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
N° Inspections 10136 10423 11578 9657 9907 10129 
N° inspections 
with deficiencies 




2651 2769 3025 
N° Detentions 110 152 176 161 156 97 
Main area of 
deficiencies 


















Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
N° Inspections 9469 9394 9232 9265 9390 9105 
N° inspections 
with deficiencies 
2718 3022 2432 2661 2445 2358 
N° Detentions 105 121 143 202 103 91 





















ISM Code 16% 
SOLAS-Fire 
Safety 22% ISM 
Code 18% 
 
Table 43 - Information related ships flagged with a Viña del Mar Agreement´s Flag 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
N° Inspections 2223 2173 2574 2082 2176 2144 
N° inspections with 
deficiencies 
Not available Not available Not available 594 649 654 
N° Detentions 25 52 62 58 59 33 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
N° Inspections 2142 2175 2133 1925 1768 1665 
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N° inspections with 
deficiencies 
643 703 627 548 482 446 
N° Detentions 35 43 57 57 33 22 
 
Table 44 - Yearly Detention Rate 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Detention Rate 1.08 1.46 1.52 1.66 1.57 0.96 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Detention Rate 1.11 1.28 1.55 2.18 1.10 0.99 
 
Table 45 - Yearly Deficiencies Rate 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 




Not available 27.45 27.95 29.86 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Deficiencies Rate 28.7 32.17 26.34 28.72 26.04 25.9 
 
Table 46 - Behavior of Viña del Mar´s Fleet in United States MOU 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Deficiencies Rate Not 
available 
Not available Not available 28.5 28.83 30.5 
Detention Rate 1.12 2.39 2.41 2.78 2.71 1.54 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Deficiencies Rate 30.00 32.32 29.39 28.47 27.26 26.79 




Figure Appendices 26 - Yearly Detention Rate 
 





















Figure Appendices 28 - Behavior of Viña del Mar´s Fleet in US MOU 
As it was explained, the United States MOU provided the Annual Reports in its website 
for the whole period but the first two years has not the information about how many 
inspections carried out showed deficiencies. However, since 2009, the information was 
complete. 
 
The analysis of the detention rate was done within the information of the twelve years 
established and it can be seen that the results showed two incrementing periods (2006 – 
2009 and 2011 – 2015) and two decreasing periods (2009 – 2011 and 2015 – 2017). The 
peak was reached in 2015, but the good news according the purpose of the IMO aim is 
that in 2017 the rate almost reached the minimum for the period and the decreasing status 
is going since 2015. 
 
Regarding the deficiencies per inspection rate, it was analyzed since 2009. In this case the 















The most common causes of deficiencies also are analyzed from 2009 because the 
explained reasons. From the analysis it can be observed that problem in the fire safety 
system has been the most relevant one in 7 over 9 years. That means that it was the main 
concern during the inspections, detecting problems in that area. It also should be 
highlighted that during the last four years may deficiencies concerned the compliment of 
the ISM Code has been detected as well. 
 
About the ships flagged with Viña del Mar Members flags, it can be seen in both rate a 
decreasing trend. The detention rate had its peak in 2015 but in 2017 it reached the 
minimum value. Regarding the deficiencies rate, the peak was reached in 2013 and since 
that moment the decrement was constant until reaching the minimum level also in 2017. 
Viña del Mar Agreement 
The Latin American Agreement on Port State Control of Vessels (Viña del Mar MOU) 
provides the Annual Reports in its website (The Latin American Agreement on Port State 
Control of Vessels (Viña del Mar MOU), 2019). In this section, its analysis will be 
conducted, taken into consideration that the information regarding the amount of 
inspections with deficiencies was not provided in the reports from 2006 -2010, for that 
reason unfortunately the analysis is not following the previous models. 
Table 47 - General Information 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
N° Inspections 6546 6856 7596 7627 8586 8841 
N° inspections 
with deficiencies 




4047 4220 4173 
N° Detentions 119 229 190 136 108 109 















































Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
N° Inspections 8946 7409 7440 6886 6830 7739 
N° inspections 
with deficiencies 
2062 1900 2368 1776 1668 1793 
N° Detentions 91 73 76 60 47 51 






































Table 48 - Information related ships flagged with a Viña del Mar Agreement´s Flag 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
N° Inspections 1554 1691 1891 1848 2074 2071 
N° inspections with 
deficiencies 
Not available Not available Not available Not available Not available 1087 
N° Detentions 33 109 75 53 43 40 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
N° Inspections 2184 1745 1766 1686 1547 1682 
N° inspections with 
deficiencies 
582 543 618 450 451 445 
N° Detentions 34 31 26 22 12 21 
 
Table 49 - Yearly Detention Rate 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Detention Rate 1.82 3.34 2.50 1.78 1.26 1.23 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 




Table 50 - Yearly Deficiencies Rate 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 




Not available 53.06 49.15 47.2 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Deficiencies Rate 23.05 25.64 31.82 25.79 24.42 23.17 
 
Table 51 - Behavior of Viña del Mar´s Fleet in its MOU 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Deficiencies Rate Not 
available 
Not available Not available Not available Not available 52.49 
Detention Rate 2.12 6.44 3.96 2.87 2.07 1.93 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Deficiencies Rate 26.65 31.11 34.99 26.69 29.15 26.45 




Figure Appendices 29 - Yearly Detention Rate 
 
 






















Figure Appendices 31 - Behavior of Viña del Mar´s Fleet in its MOU 
 
The general detention rate in the Viña del Mar MOU reached the peak in the second year 
analyzed but since that year it showed a constant decreasing trend, reaching the minimum 
level in 2017. 
 
The deficiencies rate is analyzed since 2009 as the previous values are not available in the 
Reports. Since that year, that was its peak, the trend was decreasing almost every year. 
The only exception was in 2013 and 2014, however, in 2017 the rate reached a value very 
close to the minimum that was in 2012. 
 
The analysis of the common causes of deficiencies can be done for the whole period as 
the information provided included that topic. Therefore, it can be seen that the first 7 years 












propulsion. However, since 2013 the main problem detected during the inspections have 
been related with the certificates and documentation. 
 
Finally, the analysis of the Viña del Mar Agreement fleet navigating inside MOU´s water, 
show that the detention rate has a similar behavior as the general one, as it has its peak in 
2007, but since that year it experienced a decreasing trend reaching its minimum level in 
2016. The deficiencies rate is considered since 2011 because of lack of information, 
therefore, since that year it showed a decreasing trend as the peak was precisely that year. 




Appendix M – Most common deficiencies detected by MOU 
Table 52 - Most common deficiencies detected for every MOU 
Year Abuja Black Sea Caribbean Indian Mediterranean Paris Riyadh Tokyo US Viña del Mar 
2006  1  5 1 5  5  6 
2007  1  5 1 5  5  6 
2008  2 6 5 1 1  1  6 
2009  4 3 5 1 1  5 5 6 
2010  4 2 5 1 1  5 5 6 
2011  4 5 1 1 5  5 5 6 
2012 2 2 5 1 1 5 1 5 9 6 
2013 10 2 5 1 1 1 2 5 5 2 
2014 10 11 5 1 1 1 2 5 8 2 
2015 10 4 5 1 1 5 12 5 5 2 
2016 10 5 5 1 1 5 1 5 5 2 
2017 10 4 5 1 2 1 1 5 5 2 
 
Table 53 - Category for deficiencies detected for every MOU 
1 Safety of Navigation 
2 Certificates and Documents 
3 Lifesaving appliances 
4 Structure, Stability and equipment 
5 Fire Safety Systems 
6 Propulsion and auxiliary machinery 
7 Working and living conditions 
8 ISM Code 
9 Marine Pollution 
10 Others 
11 Load Line 




Appendix N: Documents contained the outcomes of the audits, number of audits 
and findings during VIMSAS 
Table 54 - Documents contained the outcomes of the audits, number of audits and 
findings during VIMSAS 













A 25/8/2 8 audits VIMSAS 57 19 38 
C 101/6/2 9 audits VIMSAS 54 11 43 
A 26/9/1 9 audits VIMSAS 76 30 46 
C 105/6/1 8 audits VIMSAS 74 29 45 
A 27/8/1 11 audits VIMSAS 96 46 50 
C 109/5/1 7 audits VIMSAS 71 27 44 
A 28/9/1 7 audits VIMSAS 110 43 67 
C 113/5/2 4 audits Transitional 31 13 18 
A 29/9/1 4 audits Transitional 59 27 32 
C 116/6/1 8 audits Transitional 134 56 78 





Appendix O: Documents contained the outcomes of the audits, number of audits 
and findings during IMSAS 
Table 55 - Documents contained the outcomes of the audits, number of audits and 
findings during IMSAS 












18 audits IMSAS 288 267 21 
Circular N° 
3879 
15 audits IMSAS 236 216 20 
TOTAL 33 audits  524 483 41 
 
 
 
 
